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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN 
INCORPORATED, a California 
corporation, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
V. ROSS EKINS; S. 0. EKINS; 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 860322 
Respondents are not dissatisfied with appellant's 
Statement of Issues, but would state the case somewhat 
differently, as is set out below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action originally brought by a factoring 
company (Heller) to foreclose on its security interest in the 
accounts receivable, inventory, equipment, and other assets of 
its client U.S. Rock Wool Company, Inc. (Rock Wool), and to 
foreclose a subordinated trust deed that the guarantors V. Ross 
Ekins and S. 0. Ekins (the Ekins) had given on their residence to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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secure their Guaranty (R. 2-14). This action was, as to all 
defendants, premature since it was commenced during an agreed and 
unexpired extension of time, and was, as to the Ekins, filed in 
direct violation of a written agreement of Heller that it would 
take no such action until the Valley Bank seven (7) year trust 
deed installment loan was paid in full. Also, the Complaint 
sought an amount which the trial court found to be unconscionably 
excessive (Finding 9, Addendum 1). 
Some ten months after it filed the foreclosure 
Complaint, Heller filed an Amended Complaint and for the first 
time pleaded a claim for judgment against the Ekins personally on 
their written Guaranty (Amended Complaint, R. 303-339). The 
Ekins defended against this latter claim on the grounds, among 
others, that they had long since been entirely exonerated from 
their Guaranty as a matter of California law by Heller's 
intentional or negligent conduct impairing the security to which 
the Ekins looked for protection against loss on their Guaranty. 
The Ekins took the position that the California law provided that 
they were wholly released by Heller's impairment of its security, 
and that even if the Court were to conclude that their release 
was only pro tanto, the obligation of the Ekins under their 
Guaranty had, nonetheless, been fully satisfied by the amount by 
which they were exonerated. The Ekins also claimed that Heller 
had itself breached the contract first, having breached the 
covenant of good faith which is, by statute in California, a part 
of every contract; had failed to pursue in a commercially 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasonable manner collection of the accounts receivable it had 
taken over and foreclosed, and was thus barred from looking to 
Rock Wool or the Ekins for a deficiency; and that Heller was, 
under California lawf liable to the Ekins for their attorneys 
fees and expenses. Heller's form agreements provide that the law 
of California is to be controlling, which provides for 
reciprocity with respect to collection expenses and attorneys 
fees • 
The trial court found the issues in favor of the Ekins 
and against Heller; made findings that Heller had, without the 
consent of the Ekins, impaired its security for the Rock Wool 
obligation (1) by negligently or intentionally failing to perfect 
its security interest in the motor vehicles, (2) taking action 
which impaired the accounts receivable, and (3) by causing the 
going business value of the inventory to be lost; that the values 
lost by Heller's impairment of the security was $110,249.00; that 
Heller undertook to collect the accounts receivable, but failed 
to do so in a commercially reasonable manner; that Heller so 
conducted itself as to breach the implied covenant of good faith 
which was a part of the Guaranty and the other contracts; that 
Heller, in order to pressure the Ekins, had brought the 
foreclosure action in breach of the Subordination Agreement which 
barred it from taking action against the Ekins home; had failed 
to establish what amount, if any, was due and unpaid from Rock 
Wool; and was, under the contract provisions and the California 
law, obligated to pay the Ekins their attorneys fees, costs, and 
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expenses. The trial court stated its conclusions of law and 
entered judgment that the Ekins Guaranty had been released as a 
matter of law by the conduct of Heller; that the trust deed on 
the Ekins residence was also released; and that the Ekins recover 
of Heller their pre-judgment and post-judgment attorneys fees, 
costs and expenses (R. 1080-83). These findings, conclusions, 
and judgment are set out in full as Addenda 1 and 2 hereto. 
Heller moved for a new trial (R. 1103-35). The trial court 
re-examined its decision and the record supporting it and denied 
the motion (R. 1185-86).
 t ;5: 
REMEDY SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the judgment affirmed and 
their post-judgment attorneys fees, costs, and expenses 
determined and awarded. 
r STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Some of the facts are correctly recited by Heller in 
Appellant's Brief; some are not. In many instances Heller has 
recited its preferred version of conflicting evidence as if 
factual, despite a plethora of evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings; and in other instances has simply ignored the 
record, or absence of record. 
Such of Heller's statements of fact as are material to 
the questions presented in this appeal will be discussed below; 
such as are merely provocative will be discussed only when 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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essential to an understanding of the trial court's holding and 
the factual premise for such holding. 
1. The Facts Surrounding the Origination of the Loan 
to Rock Wool and the Duty to Perfect the Security. On October 8 
or 9, 1979, Jay Johnson, the Utah agent for Heller, met with V. 
Ross Ekins, president and principal owner of Rock Wool, to 
discuss factoring the accounts receivable of Rock Wool (Tr. 
1560-62). Rock Wool was in the business of subcontracting the 
insulation work on construction projects and of selling 
insulation products and services. After discussing the terms, 
Ekins told Johnson that he had some concerns about what it would 
do if Rock Wool's customers knew their accounts were being 
factored to Heller, and Johnson told him that Rock Wool's 
customers were not advised of the factoring arrangement (Tr. 
1562). Ekins' testimony about this meeting and a later meeting 
was bolstered by the notes he had made at those meetings. He had 
the original notes present at the trial for reference while 
testifying and for examination by opposing counsel. At the 
meeting he showed Johnson the Rock Wool financial statements and 
indicated that the net worth of Rock Wool was substantial (Tr. 
1564). Johnson took the Rock Wool financial statements, the 
Ekins financial statements, the accounts receivable aging 
schedule, and an accounts payable aging, put them in a package 
and sent it to Heller in the hope that Heller would make the deal 
and he would get a commission for placing the business (Tr. 
1567). 
-5-
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Some two or three weeks later James Hillman, Heller's 
assistant vice president, went to the Rock Wool office and met 
with Ekins. Hillman explained in detail the arrangement that 
would be involved? that there would have to be a physical audit 
by Heller's auditors; that Heller would have to have a security 
interest in all of Rock Wool's assets, including its vehicles, 
blowing machines, power tools, etc.; and that a personal guaranty 
would be required from the Ekins (Tr. 1569-71). When the 
discussion turned to the personal guaranty and to requiring a 
mortgage on the Ekins home to secure the guaranty, Ekins 
objected, noted that the maximum credit to be extended would be 
$125,000, that Rock Wool's assets were three or four times that 
amount, and that he did not want to put up his home. Hillman 
said the trust deed and personal guaranty were conditions of the 
loan. Ekins was still concerned about protecting his home. 
Hillman told Ekins that there were so many assets of Rock Wool 
supporting the loan that the risk of loss was minimal. The 
evidence on that point and the importance of the security to 
Ekins shows clearly in the following: 
"EKINS: I was still concerned at that point. And 
we talked about it further, and he gave 
me some assurance that made it acceptable 
to me. He said before we would go after 
your home, all of these assets of the 
"'•"' corporation, the accounts receivable, the 
inventory, the equipment, we record and 
secure our interest in those so that 
nobody else can get to them before we do. 
Therefore those then are between us and 
our having to come to you for any 
personal guaranty or for action against 
your home. Now, this is what he told me, 
and I believed him. And on that basis I 
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felt that the risk was very minimal, and 
that's when I went home and told my wifef 
the time I asked her to sign the 
document." (Tr. 1573.) 
It should be noted here that the Ekins have not claimed and do 
not claim that Heller was bound by oral covenant to proceed 
against the other security before proceeding against their home. 
The testimony above goes to the point that Heller promised to 
perfect the security and that Ekins relied upon the security to 
stand between him and ultimate loss. 
There is no question but that Rock Wool's motor 
vehicles (described in detail in later testimony), are among the 
items set out in the Chattel Mortgage between Rock Wool and 
Heller (Exhibit "D"), as well as in the Financing Statement and 
UCC-1 (Exhibit "E") which was filed to perfect the security 
interest in the assets listed in the Chattel Mortgage. On the 
second page of the Chattel Mortgage Rock Wool covenants that all 
of the mortgaged property is free and clear of liens except for 
"liens on trucks, blowing machines, and other equipment financed 
through banks," and under the U.C.C. in both California and Utah 
the term "equipment" includes motor vehicles used primarily in 
business. California Civil Code, Sections 9103(3), 9109(2); 
U.C.A., Sections 70A-9-103(3), 70A-9-109(2). 
Heller admits that it did nothing to perfect its 
security interest in the vehicles beyond filing the Combined 
Security Agreement and UCC-1. Mr. Hillman stated that he had 
intentionally failed to perfect Heller's security interest in the 
-7-
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vehicles—(under the law of both Utah and California this would 
have required the Heller lien to have been entered upon the 
titles of the motor vehicles)—and claimed that he had omitted 
perfecting the interest in the vehicles at Ekins' request. Ekins 
flatly denied making any such request and the trial court held 
that Mr. Ekins was the one who was telling the truth. Mr. Ekins1 
testimony on that point is: ? 
"TANNER: Directing your attentionf Mr. Ekinsf to 
the matter of the mortgaged vehicles. 
You heard Mr. Hillman testify that you 
said to him in effect that the mortgaged 
vehicles were encumbered and would he 
please leave them out of the security. 
Was that said by you to him? 
EKINS: Absolutely not. 
TANNER: Did you request at anytime in the 
conversation with Mr. Hillman that the 
mortgaged vehicles be left out of the 
security and that the interest in them be 
not perfected: 
* EKINS: Absolutely not." 
Failure to perfect the security in the motor vehicles was a 
matter of real significance because the total value of the motor 
vehicles in which Hillman failed to perfect Heller's security 
interest was some $122,650 (Tr. 1591-92). 
At the time of the transaction the Ekins did not know 
what steps were required to perfect Heller's security interest in 
the vehicles and equipment, and relied on Heller to take care of 
perfecting the security because "he [Hillman] told me they would" 
(Tr. 1597, 1599): 
"TANNER: What did he tell you with respect to who 
would do the perfecting on the - -
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EKINS: He (Hillman) said Heller would." 
Ekins further testified that he read the documentation 
including the UCC-l's, supposed they perfected the security in 
all the Rock Wool assets including the vehicles, and wanted them 
to do so because the security given Heller by Rock Wool was what 
stood between him and having to take a loss on the personal 
Guaranty he and Mrs. Ekins had signed, a consideration which was 
vital to his signing the documents (Tr. 1607-09). 
2. The Ekins Personal Guaranty. The Guaranty signed 
by the Ekins is especially important to this appeal, because its 
contents are the sole basis for Heller's contention that the 
trial court erred in finding that the Ekins had not consented to 
impairment of the security. In that regard it should be noted 
that the copy of the Guaranty appended to Appellant's Brief as 
"Appendix ii" is not a true copy of the document signed, instead 
it is a copy of Exhibit "G" which was offered by Heller and was 
refused admission into evidence because it contains underlining 
which was not present on the document at the time of its signing. 
A copy of the Guaranty without extraneous writing or underlining 
was admitted in evidence as Exhibit "F." A copy of the Guaranty 
which was admitted as Exhibit "F" is appended hereto as Addendum 
3. Presumably Heller's switch of these exhibits is inadvertent. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that there was no 
underlining on the Guaranty when it was signed. 
3. The Valley Loan and Heller's Subordination 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Agreement. In 1981 the Ekins were called on a mission for their 
church which would require them to be away for three years, so 
they needed to get their financial affairs in order. They had an 
existing short-term loan at Walker Bank with a balance of 
$67f000.00 that came due in full every 60-90 days. It was 
secured by a mortgage on the Ekins home which was prior to the 
Heller Trust Deed. Valley Bank agreed to lend the Ekins the 
$67,000.00 on a seven (7) year loan payable at $1,351.74 per 
month (Exhibit EE) if and only if Heller would subordinate and 
agree not to foreclose its lien on the home until the installment 
loan was paid in full (Tr. 1614-19). It was vital to the Ekins 
that their home be protected so long as their payments were 
current. They negotiated with Hillman to get the Subordination 
Agreement; transmitted it to Valley Bank and relied on it to 
safeguard their home while they were gone (Tr. 1636-37). 
Although the Ekins did not sign the Subordination 
Agreement—there was neither a place for them to sign nor a need 
for their signature—they obtained it, were understood by all to 
be the beneficiaries of it, and justifiably relied upon it. 
It should also be noted that the copy of the 
Subordination Agreement appended to Appellant's Brief as 
"Appendix iii" is not a true copy of the document signed and 
admitted into evidence as Exhibit DD. It contains pencil 
underlining and circling which was not on the document signed. A 
copy of the Subordination Agreement which was admitted as Exhibit 
DD is appended hereto as Addendum 4. Presumably Heller's switch 
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of these exhibits is also inadvertent. 
4. Rock Wool's Financial Deterioration and Eventual 
Bankruptcy. There was substantial discussion and testimony 
respecting Rock Wool's financial condition in 1982. In his 
testimony Ross Ekins pointed out that the financial statements 
showed the assets at historical cost and not at the then present 
market value (Tr. 1747-49) and that in order to have an 
understanding of Rock Wool's financial condition, the difference 
between market value and book value must be considered. 
In mid-January, 1983, Heller changed the rules by 
which it determined which accounts were qualified accounts for 
purposes of lending and threw the Rock Wool account into such a 
negative security position as to assure that the obligation was 
beyond Rock Wool's ability to bring current. Thereafter, Heller 
sent notices to all of Rock Wool's customers which had stale 
balances on them, even though Heller knew or is charged with the 
knowledge that it would receive a list of the current balances 
within the next two or three days. The effect of those notices 
and of Heller's use of outdated account balances in their 
preparation was to shut off the payments by the existing 
customers and to cause the contractors to cease to deal further 
with Rock Wool as an insulating subcontractor. The precise 
references to the record are contained in Point II of the 
Argument below. 
The trial court found that the conduct of Heller 
was the cause of the eventual destruction of Rock Wool as an 
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operable business concern and that Heller knew its conduct would 
cause Rock Wool's debtors "to stop or slow down the payment of 
their accounts and quit doing business with Rock Wool" (Finding 
No. 5; Addendum 1). 
Thereafter, on March 30, 1983, Heller commenced 
suit to foreclose the Ekins home, claiming that $116,700.43 was 
due from Rock Wool to Heller (R. 3) and was the amount of the 
lien on the Ekins house. In fact the amount then due according 
to Heller's own books and records was some $62,000.00 (Tr. 1789), 
and even that figure erroneously overcharged Rock Wool by some 
$8,279.00 (Tr. 1638 et seq.). The trial court found Heller's 
demand to be unconscionably excessive (Finding 9). 
In the same suit in which Heller sought to 
foreclose on the Ekins home, it foreclosed on the accounts 
receivable, inventory, equipment, and all other assets of Rock 
Wool described in the security agreements and UCC-1. After 
making valiant efforts to try to pay off the Heller account, Rock 
Wool was finally forced to file bankruptcy in December, 1983, 
some nine (9) months after Heller's foreclosure suit, at which 
time the trustee in bankruptcy took the position that it, not 
Heller, was the owner of the vehicles because the Heller security 
interest was not perfected in the manner required by law. Some 
time after Rock Wool filed in bankruptcy Heller filed an Amended 
Complaint seeking personal judgment against the Ekins under their 
Guaranty. The Rock Wool bankruptcy case was still open at the 
time of the trial and judgment below, and will apparently remain 
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open pending this appeal. 
In the case at bar Heller failed to establish the 
amount, if any, owed it by Rock Wool (Finding 13). Heller has 
not appealed from that Finding and is, therefore, bound by it. 
Further facts will be discussed under the respective 
issues. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
The alleged errors on which Heller bases its appeal 
fall into natural groupings as follows: 
1. There were reversible errors in law. Heller claims 
the trial court erred in its decisions as to the law governing 
the case in that (a) it failed to conclude that the language of 
the Guaranty waived or consented to impairment of the collateral; 
(b) the Ekins position as Rock Wool's controlling shareholders 
precludes them as a matter of law from claiming to be discharged 
from the Guaranty; and (c) the controlling shareholders of Rock 
Wool had an affirmative duty to see that Heller perfected the 
security interest in Rock Wool's vehicles. 
2. There were errors in factual determinations. 
Heller claims the evidence in the record is not sufficient to 
sustain certain of the trial court's findings of fact; 
3. There was an error in admitting an appraisal. 
Heller claims the trial court erred in admitting Robert Berman's 
appraisal of the value of certain motor vehicles which Berman had 
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never seen; 
4, There was an error in the ruling on attorneys fees* 
Heller claims the trial court should not have awarded attorneys 
fees to the Ekins; and 
5. Heller did not receive a fair trial. Heller claims 
that there were ex parte communications between the Ekins 
attorney and the trial judge which prevented Heller from getting 
a fair trial. 
All of the points advanced on appeal by Heller were 
carefully briefed and extensively argued in the trial court and 
rejected as lacking merit. Accordingly, the record contains 
extensive briefing which deals with some of the arguments in 
greater detail than is possible within the confines of the 
Appellate Briefs. Those trial level memoranda will be referred 
to in connection with the appropriate issues and cited as to 
their location in the trial record for such use as supplemental 
material as the Court may desire. 
POINT I 
The Guaranty neither waives the Ekins right to 
claim exoneration by Heller's impairment of 
the security given by Rock Wool nor consents 
to impairment. 
In summary, the Ekins argue under this point that: 
1. The portion of the second paragraph of the Guaranty 
that relieves Heller of the duty of exhausting, or even pursuing, 
its collateral before calling on the guarantors (Ekins) for 
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payment does not constitute a consent to the release or 
impairment of collateral; and 
2. The second sentence of the second paragraph of the 
Guaranty waives "notice • . . of the release of security," but 
does not waive or consent to either the release or the impairment 
of security. 
The precise portions of the Guaranty (see Addendum 3 
for full text of Guaranty) involved in the interpretation issues 
read as follows: 
"The undersigned also waive notice of any 
consents to the granting of indulgence or 
extension of time payment, the taking and 
releasing of security in respect of any said 
receivables, agreements, obligations, 
indebtedness or liabilities so guaranteed 
hereunder, or your accepting partial payments 
thereon or your settling, compromising or 
compounding any of the same in such manner and 
at such times as you may deem advisable, 
without in any way impairing or affecting our 
liability for the full amount thereof; and you 
shall not be required to prosecute collection, 
enforcement or other remedies against the 
Debtor or against any person liable on any 
said receivables, agreements, obligations, 
indebtedness or liabilities so guaranteed, or 
to enforce or resort to any security, liens, 
collateral or other rights or remedies thereto 
appertaining, before calling on us for 
payment; nor shall our liability in any way be 
released or affected by reason of any failure 
or delay on your part so to do." 
In the course of the trial and the motion for a new 
trial Heller argued that the second sentence of the second 
paragraph of the Guaranty should be interpreted as consenting to 
the "release" of security, and, therefore, under the doctrine of 
this Court in the recent case of Continental Bank v. Utah 
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Security Mortgage, 701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1985), which held that a 
consent to release is also a consent to impairment. The Ekins 
consented to impairment. The trial court held that the Ekins did 
not consent (Finding 1). Therefore, the trial court rejected 
Heller's contention that the language constituted a consent to 
release. As set forth more fully in the Memorandum filed by the 
Ekins below (R. 677-89), and adopted by implication by the trial 
court, the language cited does nothing more than waive "notice" 
of extension of time, taking or releasing security, accepting 
partial payment, etc.—which notice is, unless waived, required 
under California law (Sumitomo Bank of California v. Iwasaki, 447 
P.2d 956, 958 (Cal. 1968). Waiver of such "notice," does not 
constitute waiver or consent to impairment of the security. 
In its brief on appeal, Heller has apparently accepted 
that portion of the trial court's ruling, but now contends that 
the portion of the second paragraph of the Guaranty which 
provides that Heller need not proceed against the collateral 
before proceeding against the Ekins has the legal effect of 
consenting to the impairment of collateral. Such consent would, 
if given, bar the Ekins from access to the exoneration provisions 
of Section 2819, C.C.C. However, no such consent to release, and 
thus, by implication, to impairment is included in the 
Heller-drafted Guaranty, and the suggestion that Continental 
Bank, supra, holds that a provision that simply waives the 
requirement that the creditor first pursue its collateral 
constitutes a consent to release or impairment is a perversion of 
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the teaching of Continental Bank. 
As Heller contends, the interpretation of the 
provisions of the Guaranty is a matter of law on which the 
Supreme Court, under certain circumstances, need not give any 
particular weight to the trial court's interpretation. But this 
is true when, and only when, the facts constituting the 
background against which the contract is to be considered are 
agreed or undisputed. Such ^s the case here. Those facts are: 
1. The law of California is the governing law and the 
California Civil Code, as proven factually by Exhibit 1, includes 
the following sections which have application to this issue: 
"Section 2787. [Former distinctions 
abolished: Surety or guarantor 
defined: Guaranties of collection: 
Continuing guaranties] 
The distinction between sureties and 
guarantors is hereby abolished. The 
terms and their derivatives, wherever 
used in this code or in any other 
statute or law of this State now in 
force or hereafter enacted, shall 
have the same meaning, as hereafter 
in this section defined. A surety or 
guarantor is one who promises to 
answer for the debt, default, or 
miscarriage of another, or 
hypothecates property as security 
therefor. Guaranties of collection 
and continuing guaranties are forms 
of suretyship obligations, and except 
in so far as necessary in order to 
give effect to provisions specially 
relating thereto, shall be subject to 
all provisions of law relating to 
suretyships in general. 
"Section 2845. [Surety may require 
creditor to proceed against 
principal: Effect of neglect to 
proceed] 
A surety may require the creditor, 
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subject to Section 996.440 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, to proceed 
against the principal, or to pursue 
any other remedy in the creditor's 
power which the surety cannot pursue, 
and which would lighten the surety's 
burden; and if the creditor neglects 
to do so, the surety is exonerated to 
the extent to which the surety is 
thereby prejudiced. 
"Section 2819. [Acts operating to 
exonerate generally] 
A surety is exonerated, except so far 
as he may be indemnified by the 
principal, if by any act of the 
creditor, without the consent of the 
surety the original obligation of the 
principal is altered in any respect, 
or the remedies or rights of the 
creditor against the principal, in 
respect thereto, in any way impaired 
or suspended. 
"Section 2848. [Subrogation of 
surety to creditor's rights] 
THE SURETY ACQUIRES THE RIGHT OF THE 
CREDITOR. A surety, upon satisfying 
the obligation of the principal, is 
entitled to enforce every remedy 
which the creditor then has against 
the principal to the extent of 
reimbursing what he has expended, and 
also to require all his co-sureties 
to contribute thereto, without regard 
to the order of time in which they 
become such." 
2« The Guaranty is Heller's usual and required form, 
and Heller's staff was, as to all of its printed material, the 
scrivener. 
3. At the time the Guaranty was signed, Heller was a 
very large national financing institution; Rock Wool was a small 
local company; and the Guaranty form was presented to the Ekins 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
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Given the presence of these elements, any lack of 
clarity, ambiguity, or uncertainty of meaning is Heller's 
responsibility; the terms must be construed most favorably to the 
Ekins; and since the elements of a contract of adhesion are 
present and Heller contends that the record is such as to make 
the interpretation a matter of law only, untainted by dispute or 
issue of fact, the rule of strictissimi juris should apply. 
The dispute before this Court is whether, interpreted 
in light of the above circumstances, the Guaranty, by necessary 
import of its terms, contains the consent of the Ekins that 
Heller may impair the security or waives the Ekins right to claim 
the protection of the California Civil Code provision (C.C.C., 
Section 2819) that a guarantor is released if the creditor 
impairs the security given for the obligation guaranteed. 
The Ekins claim they are entitled to have the Guaranty 
construed most favorably to them because Heller is the scrivener 
and because the relationship of the parties is such as to make 
the Guaranty a contract of adhesion, thus requiring application 
of the rule of strictissimi juris. 
The background against which any guaranty agreement is 
to be construed must include the economic realities common to all 
such relationships. Any reasonable person contemplating a 
guaranty of the obligations of another must, as Ross Ekins1 
testimony directly and by reasonable implication shows he did, 
consider these questions: 
1. Are the assets given by the principal debtor to 
- 1 Q . 
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secure the debt adequate to liquidate the debt even if the 
principal debtor becomes bankrupt? If so, the credit will be 
paid in full from liquidation of the security. 
2. Where, as in California, the guarantor can, absent 
waiver, require the creditor to look to its security before 
looking to the guarantor, and the Guaranty Agreement waives that 
right, what is the effect? Under California Law (C.C.C., Section 
2848, supra), the guarantor is subrogated to the creditor's 
position in the security if the guarantor pays the debt. For 
that reason it is vital that the security not be released or 
impaired. The economic difference when the creditor is not 
required to pursue the collateral first is that the guarantor may 
have to foreclose on the security instead of the creditor doing 
so. Where an attorneys fee provision is present, guarantor 
recovers both the amount he had to pay the creditor and his costs 
of foreclosing and, so long as the security has not been 
impaired, still has the protection for which he bargained in the 
first place. 
What, then, of the pivotal problem, interpreting the 
Guaranty Agreement? As Heller points out on pages 20 and 21 of 
its Brief, the Ekins have waived the requirement of the 
California Code that Heller proceed against the security before 
calling on the Guaranty. Under Section 2845, supra, such a 
waiver permits Heller to proceed against the Ekins without first 
foreclosing the security and thus permits Heller to require the 
Ekins to invoke the protection of the security by way of their 
-9n-
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statutory subrogation. However, in the case at bar Heller did 
not take advantage of this right, instead Heller took control of 
the receivables, started the present suit, foreclosed on Rock 
Wool's assets, and tried to foreclose on the Ekins home. Nine 
months later, Heller went against the Ekins on the Guaranty, and 
now Heller contends that the language giving it power to avoid 
the requirement of Section 2845 has a dark and sinister side 
effect—that it has the effect in law of a consent that Heller is 
free to release, impair, or otherwise diminish or do away with 
the security which is the only corpus available to the Ekins for 
reimbursement. 
Heller cites Heller v. Cox, et al., 343 F. Supp. 519 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) for the proposition that the wording of the Ekins 
Guaranty constitutes consent to impairment of collateral. The 
Cox case is inapposite. It is a New York Federal District Court 
case and there is no reason to suppose that the law of New York 
is the same as California's. The issue in Cox was whether there 
was res judicata; in Cox Heller had not impaired any of the 
collateral, and the discussion of the scope and nature of the 
claimed waiver and consent was dicta. 
Heller v. Wilkinson, 627 P.2d 773 (Colo. 1983), also 
does not stand for the point for which Heller cites it. This 
becomes apparent when the rest of the sentence truncated by 
Heller is supplied. Wilkinson is dead-on-point favorable to the 
Ekins claim that once Heller took over collection of the accounts 
receivable in early 1983, it had to collect them in a 
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commercially reasonable manner. The trial court, in a finding 
not challenged by Heller, found that Heller did not proceed in a 
commercially reasonable manner (Finding 8, Addendum 1). This has 
the effect in both Utah and California of releasing Rock Wool 
either totally or pro tanto from liability for a deficiency. If 
Rock Wool is released, the Ekins Guaranty is automatically 
reduced, either totally wiped out or reduced pro tanto to the 
extent of $41,649.00 (see Finding 6). 
Had Heller quoted the entire sentence from Wilkinson, 
the affirmance of the Ekins argument would have been clear. The 
complete sentence is: 
"Hence, under the terms of the agreement, the 
defendants could not compel Heller to go 
against the security, but once Heller elected 
to do so, he was required to do so in a 
commercially reasonable manner." 
Nothing could be more abundantly clear than the fact 
that Heller with its long business experience and staff of 
attorneys could have said simply, shortly, and directly that the 
guarantor consented to the impairment of security or waived its 
right to enforce the provisions of Section 2819, if it intended 
that its Guaranty form have that effect. In California there is 
no need for the reader to be put to a determination of whether 
the fancy and complex language permitting Heller to go against 
the guarantor without having first exhausted its security is by 
some implication, projection, rationalization, or contortion also 
a consent or waiver of the protection of Section 2819. Nor is 
there any need for the reader to have to worry about the possible 
-22-
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implications of the waiver provision of the Guaranty's second 
paragraph, does it waive notice or does it waive release?. . Had 
Heller wanted the Guaranty to be construed as containing a waiver 
of Section 2819, it could have said so in plain and simple words, 
but it didn1t. 
Heller cites American Security Bank v. Clarno, 199 Cal. 
Rptr. 127, 151 Cal. App. 3d 874 (Cal. App. 1984), in support of 
its position. However, a close reading of the case reveals that 
the reason the guarantors involved there were not released under 
Section 2819 was not that their guarantee was absolute and 
unconditional or because it did not require the creditor to 
proceed against the collateral, but rather was that the 
guarantors had waived their rights under Section 2819 when they 
had "consented" to the "substitution, exchange, or release of all 
or any part of the collateral." Supra at 131. It was because 
the guarantors had consented to the release of collateral and 
that they could not raise the impairment of collateral defense; 
it was not because they had signed an "unconditional guaranty." 
As the Ekins did not consent to a release or other 
impairment of collateral, Clarno is distinguishable and does not 
support the proposition that the Ekins cannot assert Section 2819 
as a defense to liability in the case at bar. For a more 
extended discussion of the issues raised by Clarno refer to the 
Memorandum at R. 674-677. 
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*. POINT II
 % 
The record contains adequate evidence to 
sustain each of the trial court's findings 
which is challenged by Appellant, However, 
even if the challenged findings were deletedf 
the remaining findings sustain judgment for 
the Ekins. 
Before considering whether the findings that are 
challenged are supported by the record, it should be observed 
that the findings which are not challenged are sufficient by 
themselves to require judgment in favor of the Ekins. The 
Findings and Conclusions are set out in full as Addendum 1 at the 
end hereof, and the Judgment as Addendum 2. The trial court 
found that Heller had impaired its security by three acts or 
omissions: 
1. Heller failed to perfect its security interest in 
the motor vehicles, which failure materially impaired that 
security (Finding 4, Addendum 1). 
2. Heller impaired its rights and remedies [security 
interest] in the accounts receivable (Finding 5). 
3. Heller impaired its security interest in the 
inventory (Finding 5). 
Any one of these impairments, each of which is material 
as is shown by Finding 6, is sufficient under Section 2819, 
California Civil Code, supra, to exonerate the Ekins from their 
Guaranty. It only takes one. As to the value of the vehicles 
lost to the Ekins as security by Heller's impairment, Heller has 
claimed that the Berman appraisal is inadmissible. This claim is 
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without merit; however, even if Heller were correct the trial 
court could not have concluded that the value of those vehicles 
was so insubstantial as to render the impairment immaterial. 
The portion of Finding 5 that finds that Heller 
impaired the accounts receivable and of Finding 6 establishing 
the amount of that impairment as being $41,649.00 are sufficient 
standing alone to require judgment for the Ekins under California 
law unless this Court finds that the very terms of the Guaranty 
constitute consent to such impairment. 
Nonetheless, appellant argues that certain of the trial 
court's findings of fact are erroneous and that argument, which 
is fallacious, must be answered. The findings Heller disputes 
are (1) those acts and omissions found to constitute a breach of 
Heller's obligation of good faith (Appellant's Argument V), and 
(2) that Heller impaired Rock Wool's inventory in the amount of 
$25,000.00 or any other amount (Appellant's Argument VI). 
The legal standard for determining the sufficiency of 
evidence to sustain a finding is stated somewhat differently in 
different decisions of this Court. In Bennion v. Hansen, 699 
P.2d 758 (Utah 1985), the standard is said to be: 
"On appeal, the findings of the trial court 
will not be disturbed unless there is no 
substantial record evidence to support them. 
See, e.g., Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, 
Utah, 636 P.2d 487, 488 (1981). In reviewing 
the evidence, we view it in the light most 
favorable to the trial court. See, e.g., 
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 254, 495 
P.2d 28, 29 (1972) 
In Union Pacific Railroad Company, 649 P.2d 48 (Utah 
-9t;_ 
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1982), the standard is described in this fashion: 
"As we have freguently stated, in a non-jury 
trial it is the trial judge's prerogative to 
find facts—including judging the credibility 
of witnesses, weighing the reliability of 
other evidence, and drawing fairly derived and 
reasonable inferences therefrom. On appeal 
this Court reviews the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court findings. 
Where there is competent evidence to support 
the findings this Court must sustain them 
(citing cases . ) " 
r? *> It follows that the challenged findings will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the record contains no evidence to 
support the finding, or the evidence is insubstantial, or the 
evidence is incompetent. In the case at bar, the record contains 
an abundance of competent, compelling evidence, often unrebutted, 
to support each of the findings of fact objected to by Heller. 
We will discuss the challenged findings of fact in the order of 
their presentation in Heller's Brief: 
1.. The findings respecting bad faith. These findings 
are contained in Finding 9 which reads as follows: 
"9. The California Civil Code imposes on all 
parties to a contract an obligation of good 
faith in its performance or enforcement. 
Heller has breached this obligation in its 
enforcement of the contracts on which it 
claims the Ekins are liable (a) by changing 
the operating rules on Rock Wool unilaterally 
and creating an insuperable negative balance 
of accounts receivable security; (b) by giving 
notice to Rock Wool's customers which were 
taken from an obsolete customer list known by 
Heller to contain obsolete balances, and doing 
so at a time when Heller knew it would receive 
in a day or two the regular monthly updated 
list from Rock Wool containing current 
information; and (c) by attempting to coerce 
the Ekins by filing suit without notice or 
demand at a time Heller knew the Ekins' were 
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gone from Utah on a multi-year assignment, by 
claiming an unconscionably excessive amount, 
and by seeking the immediate appointment of a 
receiver to take possession of Ekins1 home and 
having it sold at a sheriff's sale, all at a 
time when Heller was bound by contract not to 
take action against the Ekins' home." 
That the California law imposes a duty of good faith in 
all contracts has not been disputed by Heller. The trial court 
found Heller to have breached that covenant in three respects. 
Does the record support this? Yes, as follows: 
a. That Heller changed its rules and created an 
insuperable negative balance is supported by: 
(1) The testimony of David Ekins (Tr. 1775-82) so 
stating. The following extracts are on point: 
"TANNER: "With respect to that subject, will you 
tell us what happened and whether it is a 
matter of any significance in the course 
of the operation of this business? 
EKINS: 
TANNER: 
There's a great deal of significance. 
First, explain to us what happened. 
EKINS: On Exhibit D-9, report number 673, I had 
a telephone call from Jim Hillman, Walter 
E. Heller Western, who informed me that 
— that they have been ever since the 
beginning of the agreement miscalculating 
apparently or misinterpreting rather our 
accounts receivable aging such that I 
needed to change the hold-out figure 
which is shown on line 6 to $171,000. 
This had the formula effect of having our 
loan availability a minus $52,196.96. 
. . . 
TANNER: Had Heller given you any notice or 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EKINS: 
knowledge prior to the time of the 
telephone call to which you just referred 
that there would be the change made to 
which you just referred? 
None whatsoever. 
TANNER: 
EKINS; 
Was the interpretation which Heller had 
utilized up to and including the time 
shown in Exhibit 8 different from the 
interpretation which is embodied in 
Exhibit 9? I'm speaking of Heller's 
interpretation of the accounts receivable 
and those which were qualified and not 
qualified to be considered. 
Their interpretation prior to that time 
was the same as ours. 
TANNER: And were you — would you be able — did 
you expect that you would be able to 
operate effectively under the 
interpretation of the aging schedules 
that was reflected in Mr. Hillman's 
message to you and in Exhibit S? 
TANNER: After the change? 
EKINS: Yes. 
TANNER: No." 
(2) The testimony of James Hillman (Heller's vice 
president) explaining the effect of the change in accounting 
requirements and the significance to Rock Wool. This testimony 
is set out in the copy of Tr. 1417-19 attached hereto as Addendum 
5, which is entirely consistent with the David Ekins testimony 
and establishes that Heller knew what effect the change would 
have on Rock Wool. 
(3) The testimony of V. Ross Ekins (Tr. 1685) as 
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follows: 
"EKINS: You want me to tell you what the factors 
were that caused us to [file bankruptcy]? 
ANDERSON: Yes, sir. 
EKINS: I would love to. 
EKINS: The straw that broke the camel's back, 
and we had a lot of other troubles, was 
when Heller changed their formula for 
arithmetically determining the figure 
they always gave to us each month, 
telling us what the unqualified accounts 
receivable were which had the net effect 
of putting us into a deficit position, as 
has been testified to here, by some 
$55,000 which turned off cash flow, 
positive cash flow, over night which 
virtually — " 
b. That Heller sent notices to Rock Wool's customers 
demanding that they pay Heller incorrect amounts which Heller had 
taken from a stale list when a new and current list was expected 
by Heller and coming from Rock Wool in the next few days is 
established by: 
(1) The date the notices were prepared and sent 
(see Exhibit T, exemplar of notice, attached hereto as Addendum 
6). 
(2) Hillman's testimony that on February 7, 1983, 
he instructed his staff to send the notices to Rock Wool's 
customers (Tr. 1343) and didn't know what accounts aging list he 
had on hand or when Heller usually received its monthly update 
from Rock Wool, but that current accounts receivable aging lists 
were supposed to be in Heller's hand by the 10th of each month 
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(Tr. 1315-18). 
(3) David Ekins testimony that he sent Heller an 
updated accounts receivable aging list between February 10th and 
15th, as was his custom (Tr. 1787-88). 
(4) When the notices were sent out Rock Wool began 
getting angry calls from debtors who said the accounting 
information was incorrect, which was true, and the contractors 
held off payment (Tr. 1784-85). 
c. That Heller attempted to coerce the Ekins into 
paying the Rock Wool debt (i) by suing to foreclose on their 
home, (ii) without prior notice, (iii) while the Ekins were away 
on a long-term assignment, (iv) by claiming an unconscionably 
excessive amount and seeking appointment of a receiver, and (v) 
all at a time when Heller was bound by contract not to foreclose 
on the Ekins home is established by: 
(1) Heller's Subordination Agreement (Exhibit DD 
and Addendum 4 hereto), which, paragraph 10 of the Findings 
shows, precluded Heller from foreclosing on the Ekins home until 
the Ekins had paid off the Valley Bank trust deed (some seven (7) 
years from May, 1981) or had defaulted in making their payments 
to Valley Bank. Heller started its foreclosure action on March 
30, 1983 (Tr. 2, showing filing date of Complaint) even though 
the Ekins had never defaulted in their payments to Valley Bank. 
(2) That the Ekins were on a three (3) year church 
assignment in Tennessee from June, 1981 until June, 1984 is 
acknowledged by all parties. ,f 
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(3) In the March, 1983 foreclosure action Heller 
claimed $116,700.43 to be due from Rock Wool (Tr. 4, page 3 of 
the Complaint) when Heller's books showed only between $57,000.00 
and $62,000.00 to be due from Rock Wool. 
(4) The Complaint sought an immediate receivership 
for the Ekins home (R. 5 and 10). 
(5) Mr. Hillman's testimony that the purpose of 
these actions was to put pressure on the Ekins to pay Rock Wool's 
debt to Heller (Tr. 1380-84, copy attached as Addendum 6). 
2. The finding that Heller impaired the security 
consisting of inventory by $25,000.00. Finding 6 finds that 
Heller impaired the motor vehicles in the sum of $43,600.00, the 
accounts receivable in the amount of $41,649.00, and the 
inventory by $25,000.00. In this appeal Heller challenges the 
admission of the Berman appraisal of the vehicles, but offered no 
rebuttal testimony as to value; does not challenge the accounts 
receivable figure; and does challenge the inventory loss. 
Query, is there any competent evidence establishing 
the $25,000.00 figure? Yes, David Ekins, the manager of Rock 
Wool, was asked whether he would have received any more for the 
inventory on a going business basis than was received in 
liquidation, and Ekins testified he would have received 
$25,000.00 more. On further examination Ekins reiterated and 
supported his prior testimony (Tr. 1820-21). This testimony was 
elicited from the person directly in charge of the operation, and 
was neither objected to by Heller nor made subject of a motion to 
- 1 1 -
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strike. 
Since there is an overwhelming preponderance of 
evidence, mostly unrebutted, supporting the only findings of fact 
Heller challenges in this appeal, this Court must, by its own 
rules, affirm the trial court's findings in their entirety, the 
challenged and the unchallenged. Thus sustained, they compel 
affirmance of the conclusions of law and judgment. 
POINT III 
The Berman appraisal of Rock Wool motor 
vehicles was properly admitted. Even if it 
had been an error, the error was harmless. 
In its Argument VI Heller attacks the appraisal of Rock 
Wool vehicles made by Robert Berman and admitted in evidence 
below. Heller contends that an appraiser is by definition an 
expert witness; that Rule 703, U.R.E. governs the admissibility 
of his opinion; and the Ekins did not lay a proper foundation for 
admission of the appraisal. This evidence was admitted over 
Heller's objection. 
Missing from Heller's argument is any claim that the 
outcome of the suit would have been affected in any fashion if 
the Berman appraisal had not been admitted. Absence materiality 
and prejudice an error in an evidentiary ruling does not 
constitute reversible error. In the case at bar, the trial court 
held the Ekins to have been released from their Guaranty by 
virtue of Heller's impairing its security interest in Rock Wool's 
vehicles, in the accounts receivable, and in the inventory—any 
-??-
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one of which, standing alone, would have triggered the mechanism 
of Section 2819, C.C.C., and fully released the guarantor. At a 
minimum Berman's appraisal showed that whether the guarantors 
were released ab initio, or at the time of the Heller foreclosure 
action, or at the time the vehicles were sold, or at some other 
time, the vehicles had a substantial value sufficient to make the 
impairment of security a material impairment. Had the trial 
court erred and held that the effect of Section 2819, C.C.C., was 
a pro tanto exoneration of the sureties (guarantors), the exact 
dollar value would have been necessary to show the dollar value 
of the offset. However, the trial court properly concluded that 
any material impairment of security exonerates in full. Had 
Berman's testimony of value been excluded, the outcome would 
still have been adequately supported by Heller's impairment of 
the other two parts of the security. 
The particular alleged error in an evidentiary ruling 
would not, even if made, have warranted reversal. But no error 
was made. A careful and adequate foundation for Berman's 
appraisal appears in the record. He was qualified as an expert 
in vehicle appraisal (Tr. 1483-4) who had appraised some 10,000 
vehicles. He was given a full description of the vehicles (long 
since sold or disposed of) that Rock Wool had as of March 30, 
1983 (Exhibit 6). As a practical matter, a description was all 
that could have been given to any expert—the cars were 
unavailable. Using the written description as the factual 
premise, he stated his opinion of the value of each vehicle. 
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Rule 703 is broader than former Rule 56 and allows an 
expert to base his opinion on facts or data not admissible in 
evidence if of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
field. For example, a psychiatrist testifying as to defendant's 
sanity could base the opinion on conversations he had with others 
who had dealt with the defendant. The Court notes that the 
expert is fully capable of judging what is or is not a reliable 
basis for his opinion, United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 1476, 149 
(9th Cir. 1975). And, contrary to Heller's contentions, Mr. 
Berman did not indicate that it was unusual for him to render an 
appraisal without seeing the vehicle (Tr. 149). 
Even under the more restrictive Rule 56, an expert was 
able to testify as to value even though his conclusions were 
based entirely upon hearsay evidence. United States v. 5139.5 
Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659, 662 (4th Cir. 1952); United States 
v. Sowards, 339 F.2d 401, 402 (10th Cir. 1964). 
There was no other basis to establish value. David 
Ekins was present to be cross examined. 
Had Heller actually felt there was error in the Berman 
appraisal of the value of the vehicles, it could have called its 
own appraiser, given him the very description given Berman, and 
put his appraisal in evidence. This could have been done during 
discovery or during trial. No such rebuttal was offered. Where, 
as here—and as in the case of many, perhaps most, opinion 
evidence—the opinion must be premised on facts related to the 
expert by others, the opinion is not rendered inadmissible 
-^U-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
because the observer of the facts does not have the same 
background and perception as the expert. 
POINT IV 
That the Ekins were the controlling stock-
holders of Rock Wool does not preclude them 
from claiming to be released from their 
Guaranty, nor does it, under the facts of this 
case, require them to ensure that Heller 
perfect its security interest in the Rock Wool 
assets. 
In Argument IV of Appellant's Brief Heller contends 
that the Ekins cannot assert a discharge based on Heller's 
negligence because they are controlling shareholders. This 
Heller contends is established law and is supported by numerous 
cases. For authority Heller cites the Court to six cases. Of 
the six cases, two, Rushton and Kruger, are not on point; in 
fact, they do not even deal with the issue for which they are 
cited. With regard to the other four, they are the only cases 
that can be found to support Heller's proposition. Thus, while 
there is some support for Heller's position, it can hardly be 
considered "established law" or "widely recognized." In truth, 
the law is just the opposite. 
Heller's argument essentially is that this Court should 
not even consider the merits of the Ekins defenses because they 
are controlling shareholders and officers of U.S. Rock Wool. The 
following is a list of cases where guarantors who were also 
controlling shareholders, officers, or directors of the principal 
were permitted to raise suretyship defenses. In most of the 
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cases cited, the guarantors did not prevail on their defenses. 
However, it was on the merits that they failed, i.e., the Court 
found that they had consented to an impairment, an issue that 
would have been moot if control, shareholding, or directorship 
precluded them from asserting the defense. The list is not 
exhaustive, even on the one suretyship defense. No doubt many 
other cases could be found if all suretyship defense cases were 
surveyed. The cited cases are: 
American Security Bank v. Clarno, 151 Cal. App. 3d 874, 
199 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1984) . 
American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo, 540 P.2d 1294 
(N.M. 1975) . 
Union Bank v. Ross, 54 Cal. App. 296, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
646 (App. 1976) . 
,;..: r • ,•.  Executive Bank of Fort Lauderdale v. Tighe, 32 U.C.C. 
Rptr. 894, 445 N.Y.S. 2d 339 (Ct. App. 1981). 
Etelson v. Suburban Trust Co., 9 U.C.C. Rptr. 1371, 283 
A.2d 408 (Md. 1971) . 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Biafore, 18 U.C.C. 
Rptr. 519 (3rd Cir. Ct. of App. 1975). 
Commerce Bank of St. Louis v. Wright, 37 U.C.C. Rptr. 
502, 645 S.W. 2d 17 (Mo. 1982). 
Lawyer1s Title Insurance Corp. v. Northeast Texas 
Development Co., 34 U.C.C. Rptr. 604, 635 S.W. 2d 897 (Tex. 
1982) . 
Wilson v. Baxley State Bank, 29 U.C.C. Rptr. 1550 (Ga. 
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1980). 
First Nat'l Bank v. Hangen Ford
 y Inc., 219 N.W. 2d 847 
(N.D. 1974). 
Peoples Bank v. Pied Piper Retreat, Inc., 209 S.E. 2d 
573 (W.V. Sup. App. 1974). 
First Bank & Trust Co. v. Post, 293 N.E. 2d 907 (111. 
App. 1973). 
McHenry State Bank v. Y & A Trucking, 454 N.E. 2d 349 
(111. App. 1983). 
Peacock v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 454 So. 2d 734 
(Fla. App. 1984). 
Walter E. Heller & Co., Inc. v. Wilkerson, 627 P.2d 773 
(Colo. App. 1980). 
Huey v. Port Gibson Bank, 390 So. 1009 (Miss. 1980). 
In Argument IV Heller asserts that its position "is so 
widely recognized that one court has stated that it could find 
1
. . .no reported case where a person who has an interest in the 
transaction can avail himself of this defense [discharge or 
release] where there has been a failure to file a financing 
statement.1 Mikanis Trading Corp. v. Lowenthal, 22 U.C.C. Rptr. 
1000 (N.Y. 1977)." Heller's claim is clearly in error as the 
above list of cases shows. In fact, the case cited as authority 
for that erroneous proposition, Mikanis, was later overruled by 
implication in Executive Bank of Fort Lauderdale v. Tighe, 411 
N.Y.S. 2d 939 (Sup. Ct. 1978). Tighe involved a creditor which 
had failed to perfect its security interest and the guarantors 
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were officers and shareholders of the debtor. The Court 
recognized the Mikanis case and yet still permitted the 
guarantors to raise the defenses of a failure to perfect.. The 
case was modified on appeal for other reasons. Executive Bank of 
Fort Lauderdale v. Tighey 445 N.Y.S. 2d 425, 429 N.E. 2d 1054 
(Ct. App. 1981). 
Apart from the numerous cases which rebut its position. 
Heller's argument is theoretically flawed. It's argument would 
require this Court to ignore the corporate form and to attribute 
corporate actions to its shareholders and to require the 
shareholders to perform certain acts in order to protect their 
own non-corporate interests. To obtain that result requires a 
piercing of the corporate veil, which can be done only upon a 
finding that the corporate form was used to perpetrate fraud and 
that the corporate entity was a sham. Dockstrader v. Walker, 510 
P.2d 526 (Utah 1973). Heller has not made such a showing. In 
fact, Heller's argument would require that all shareholder 
guarantors be treated as if their corporations were shams. 
Heller's argument is also factually flawed. Heller 
contends that the Ekins had an affirmative duty to see that the 
security interest was perfected. This argument ignores the 
testimony of Ross Ekins that Heller's agent, Hillman, 
specifically told Ekins that he (Hillman) would do the perfecting 
(see pages 9 and 10 of Statement of Facts, supra). It also 
ignores the testimony of David Ekins (Tr. 1814) that another of 
Heller's agents, Mr. Arterberry, told him that filing the UCC-1 
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had perfected the security interest in the vehicles. 
Heller is in the business of making secured loans; it 
should know what is required to perfect various types of security 
interests. It chose to have California law, not Utah law, be its 
standard. It claimed that it deliberately failed to perfect this 
valuable security and then sought to escape responsibility by 
lying about its reasons for doing so. The trial court found as a 
fact that Heller undertook responsibility for perfecting this 
security interest and held it responsible for the consequences. 
Furthermore, even if Heller was correct in its 
assertion, it still must fail because the trial court found that 
it failed to collect the accounts receivable in a commercially 
reasonable manner (Finding 8). This failure, which is entirely 
outside the Ekins control, even under Heller's theory, would 
release the Ekins. Under Western Decor & Furnishings v. Bank of 
America, 154 Cal. Rptr. 287 (App. 1979), a creditor cannot obtain 
a deficiency judgment where it fails to collect the accounts 
receivable in a commercially reasonable manner. 
POINT V 
The trial court was required by California law 
to award the Ekins their attorneys fees and 
the determination of the proper amount is the 
sole province of the trial court. 
As indicated in Appellant's Brief, the trial court 
awarded attorneys fees and costs to the Ekins on the basis of 
California Civil Code, Section 1717, which provides that where a 
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contract specifically provides for one party to recover attorneys 
fees and costs, the opposing party shall be awarded its attorneys 
fees and costs if it prevails. ,.,/. 
In the principal action Heller first sought to enforce 
its various loan agreements and trust deed against the Ekins home 
and in connection therewith sought the entire sum claimed due 
from Rock Wool together with attorneys fees and costs incurred in 
foreclosing the Ekins Trust Deed which secured the Ekins Guaranty 
(R. 5 and R. 9). Clearly Heller claimed to be entitled to 
attorneys fees for its efforts in that enterprise. Under 
California law the Ekins would, therefore, also be entitled to 
recover their attorneys fees if they were the parties that 
prevailed in the foreclosure action. 
When Heller later amended its Complaint (R. 303 et 
seq.) to include a count for a personal judgment against the 
Ekins, it again claimed all expenses, collection charges, court 
costs, and attorneys fees "incurred by Heller in the collection 
of monies advanced to Rock Wool under the Loan Agreement" (R. 
00307) and "Attorneys fees as provided in the Guaranty 
Agreement;" and "costs and interest as provided by law" (R. 
00314). 
It is inconceivable that Heller, had it prevailed, 
would have sought against the Ekins anything less than its entire 
attorneys fees incurred in any and every aspect of the case. In 
fact, Heller in its invoices to Rock Wool (the very invoices on 
which it sought to recover against the Ekins under their 
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Guaranty) included all attorneys fees as they were incurred 
(Exhibit CC). Further, at the close of evidence Heller submitted 
its Affidavit respecting the attorneys fees it sought to recover 
and included all services of any and every kind incurred in any 
aspect of the cause (R. 751-94). The only justification for this 
kind of an award against the Ekins would necessarily have to be 
that Heller claimed the Ekins to be responsible for all Heller's 
costs, expenses, and attorneys fees in any way connected with the 
various agreements, including the Guaranty. When it thought it 
might prevail, Heller took the position that the Guaranty did 
provide for the award of all attorneys fees, costs, and expenses 
in any way connected with its enforcement, and when Heller did 
not prevail, has taken the opposite position. It should not be 
permitted to speak out of both sides of its mouth. 
Even more compelling is the wording of the Guaranty 
itself, complex, detailed, interwoven with references intra se, 
and possibly less than totally clear about the scope of attorneys 
fees recoverable by Heller. Like the other provisions of the 
Guaranty, any unclear, obscure, or ambiguous provision must be 
construed most strongly in favor of the Ekins. Please note the 
following provisions of paragraph 1 of the Guaranty (Exhibit "F," 
copy appended hereto): 
" . . . we, the undersigned, for value 
received, do hereby jointly and severally 
unconditionally guarantee to you and your 
assigns the prompt payment in full at maturity 
and all times thereafter . . . of any and all 
indebtedness, obligations and liabilities of 
every kind or nature . . . now or at any time 
hereafter owing to you by the Debtor, . . . or 
-41 - . 
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contained in any other agreements, 
undertakings or obligations of the Debtor with 
or to you, of any kind or nature, and we also 
hereby jointly and severally agree on demand 
k/, : to reimburse you and your assigns for all 
expenses, collection charges, court costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in endeavoring to 
collect or enforce any of the foregoing 
against the Debtor and/or undersigned or any 
other person or concern liable hereon; for all 
of which, with interest at the highest lawful 
contract rate after due until paid, we hereby 
jointly and severally agree to be directly, 
unconditionally and primarily liable jointly 
^ and severally with the Debtor, and agree that 
the same may be recovered in the same or 
separate actions brought to recover the 
principal indebtedness." 
It is inconceivable that Heller would have been willing 
to agree that this provision did not require that it be 
reimbursed its fees for enforcing the Guaranty had it prevailed 
below. As the record shows, Heller did claim its fees for such 
services (supra), thus proving that, until it lost the case, it 
interpreted the Guaranty the same way as did the trial judge. 
The Ekins submit that the trial court was correct in 
entering judgment for attorneys fees, expenses, and other costs 
as determined by it, and providing for the supplemental award of 
such attorneys fees, costs, and expenses as may be incurred by 
the Ekins post-judgment. On remand the trial court should be 
asked to determine the amount of the further attorneys fees, 
costs, and expenses, and add them. Further discussion of this 
subject is found in the Memorandum of the Ekins filed at R. 1053 
et seq. 
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POINT VI 
The record is clear that there were no ex 
parte communications between the Ekins counsel 
and the trial judge respecting the merits of 
the case. Ex parte contact respecting 
procedural matters is encouraged by the rules 
of procedure below. 
There is no question but that there were ex parte 
communications between the Ekins counsel and the trial judge (R. 
878f et seq; App. iv to Appellant's Brief) and between Heller's 
counsel and the trial judge (R. 756, 2d line from end; R. 773f 
lines 8 and 9 from end; R. 788, lines 14 and 15). As is 
discussed below, the record is absolutely clear that there were 
no ex parte communications between the Ekins counsel and the 
trial judge other than communications respecting procedural 
matters such as ascertaining when the trial court could hear 
matters pending among the parties. 
Heller has leaped from the premise that there were 
contacts between the Ekins counsel and the trial judge to the 
conclusion that such contacts involved the merits of the cause. 
It has made this assertion without any record or factual premise 
other than the existence of the contacts between Court and 
counsel, and Heller's wholly unwarranted suspicion that the Court 
and counsel were engaging in improper and unethical discussions. 
The trial record consists of the Affidavit of Tanner explaining 
each of the contacts listed in his time sheets (R. 1154-1161) and 
the statement of Judge Dee for the record in open court 
respecting the nature of those communications. Tr. 1926-1931, 
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the entire statement of Judge Dee on this matter, is appended 
hereto as Addendum 7. For reasons of its own Heller neglected to 
put pages 1926-1928 in the extract appended to its Brief.. 
»-. Mr. Tanner's Affidavit (R. 1154) states under oath the 
occasion for and the contents of each contact cited by Heller. 
None is a breach of ethics or good faith, and none involved a 
discussion of the merits. A full copy of this affidavit is 
appended hereto as Addendum 8. Heller's counsel filed a 
counter-affidavit (R. 1147) which did not even purport to rebut 
the Tanner affidavit. 
The trial court, after explaining the nature of and 
necessity for contacts between trial counsel and the Court, said 
(Tr. 1928): 
" . . . but I will assure you and your clients 
. . . that I was in no way backdoored by Mr. 
Tanner. He wouldn't and I wouldn't." 
There is a total lack of factual premise upon which 
this Court could base a conclusion that either Mr. Tanner or 
Judge Dee violated the ethical principles to which they are bound 
by oath, or that Heller, whose counsel also made ex parte 
contacts with the Court, was deprived of a fair trial. For 
supplemental material, including a strong statement of counsel's 
view of what it considers to be scurrilous and irresponsible 
aspersions, see trial memoranda at R. 1139-44, Ekins' Motion in 
Opposition to Appellant's Motion for Summary Disposition, pp. 
5-17, and the record of the oral argument of Heller's motion for 
a new trial (Tr. 1901-1931, particularly the argument on this 
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point at pages 1903-1906f 1913-1918, and 1924-1931). 
Heller also failed to prove that the alleged misconduct 
was "prejudicial." Absent prejudice Heller could not be entitled 
to a new trial under Rule 61 U.R.C.P. Error insufficient to 
warrant a new trial is insufficient to warrant reversal on 
appeal. Appellant must show the existence of a reasonable 
likelihood that unfairness or injustice resulted from the alleged 
misconduct. Ewell & Son v. Salt Lake City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188f 
493 P.2d 1283 (1972). Nothing before the trial court sustains 
this burden. Even when the affidavits are viewed in a light most 
favorable to Heller, they do not show any likelihood of 
unfairness or injustice. The most they show is that there were 
several communications by the Ekins1 counsel to the court more 
than one year prior to trial concerning matters unrelated to 
trial issues; and that one contact occurred during trial and 
related to when the trial was to reconvene. 
However, Heller contends that any ex parte contact with 
the court, even if it is merely to deliver a courtesy copy of 
pleadings to the clerk, is sufficient to establish the requisite 
prejudice. In this Heller is mistaken. Where there is an 
allegation of attorney misconduct the Court must still determine 
whether it was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. 
"The standard for making this determinatin is whether the errors 
were 'real and substantial and such as may reasonably be supposed 
would affect the result.1" Nelson, supra at 734, quoting Ivie v. 
Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 13, 366 P.2d 781, 787 (1959). In other 
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words, even if it is assumed that the contacts between Ekins1 
,- counsel and the trial court were in fact irregularities, Heller 
r must still show a reasonable likelihood that the contacts. 
affected the result. Heller cannot show prejudice by merely 
alleging that ex parte contacts were prejudicial. 
In Arellano v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 5 Utah 2d 
151, 298 P.2d 527 (1956), this court faced a similar argument. 
Plaintiff claimed she was entitled to a new trial because of jury 
misconduct. In support of her motion, plaintiff offered three 
affidavits which showed that a brother of one of the jurors was 
an attorney, that the attorney was heard to say that he knew all 
about the case because his brother was on the jury, and finally, 
that in jury deliberations the juror led the discussion. The 
plaintiff claimed that the juror had spoken with his brother 
about the case and had violated the rule dealing with separation 
of the jury. In that case this Court stated: 
"Let it be assumed . . . that it had been 
proved that the accused juror talked with his 
. brother concerning the case. Such conduct 
violates Rule 47(k). Does such misconduct 
require the trial court to grant a new trial? 
It is doubted if such misconduct on the part 
of a juror, nothing more appearing than here, 
would justify the court in granting a new 
trial. Certainly the court did not commit 
error in refusing to grant the new trial. 
w
 . . . The fact that a juror has a brother 
who is an attorney and that the juror takes 
the lead in the jury room is not sufficient 
proof of prejudice. Some further proof must 
be made that the juror actually conversed with 
his brother and that such conversation 
influenced the juror so as to prejudice the 
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plaintiff's cause. There was no such showing 
in the instant case." 
Arellano, supra at 529-530 (emphasis added). 
See also State v. Packett, 294 N.W. 2d 605 (Neb. 1980), which 
held that even where (unlike the case at bar) there were ex parte 
discussions on the merits, that alone was insufficient to warrant 
a new trial. In that case, the trial court's determination that 
the movant suffered no prejudice was upheld. 
Because there is a presumption favoring the validity of 
the judgment, Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 
(1966), Heller must show prejudice or have its appeal denied. 
There has been no showing of misconduct and not even an attempt 
by Heller to show prejudice. 
POINT VII 
Heller is bound by the trial court's finding 
that Heller failed to establish the correct 
amount, if any, unpaid by Rock Wool under its 
contracts with Heller. This is fatal to 
Heller's appeal. 
In the case at bar, as in every case seeking damages, 
the plaintiff must prove the amount of his loss or damage with 
sufficient certainty as to permit the trier of fact to determine 
the amount of damages. Failure to do so is fatal and the trial 
court must rule for the defendant. 
In a suit on a guaranty, the limit of guarantor's 
obligation is to make up the amount or amounts due and unpaid the 
creditor by the principal debtor under the contract or contracts 
guaranteed. The evidence must permit the trial court to 
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determine the correct amount, or the plaintiff cannot be awarded 
judgment. In the case at bar there is another proceeding pending 
between Rock Wool and Heller in the bankruptcy court, but- the 
case at bar is the only proceeding pending between the Ekins and 
Heller, and it was initiated by Heller. Rock Wool, a named 
defendant herein, agreed with Heller not to participate in this 
trial, but to defer to the bankruptcy court to resolve its 
account with Heller. The Ekins made no such agreement. 
Accordingly, Heller must have proved the amount of the liability 
of the Ekins or Heller cannot have been entitled to either a 
money judgment against the Ekins, or a judgment of foreclosure. 
Finding 13 reads as follows: 
"13. Heller has failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence or in any other 
fashion the correct amount, if any, remaining 
due and unpaid by Rock Wool under its 
contracts with Heller." 
Since Heller has not challenged Finding 13 in its 
appeal of this case and cannot now be heard to complain of it, 
Heller has failed to establish an essential element of its cause 
and cannot, therefore, prevail in its appeal. 
This point alone is dispositive of the Heller appeal. 
That the issues Heller did raise on appeal are without merit is 
only cumulative. Nonetheless, prudence requires that the Ekins 
respond to each point raised by Heller, and the Ekins have done 
SO. : - • ? : . ;.':. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the trial court the Ekins prevailed on four grounds, 
first, that under California law Heller's impairment of the 
security exonerated the Ekins from their Guaranty; second, that 
Heller was in breach of its contracts (the Guaranty and, by 
reference, the Mortgage and Security Agreements) with the Ekins, 
and therefore could not enforce the Guaranty; third, that Heller 
failed to pursue the accounts receivable in a commercially 
reasonable manner, thus releasing Rock Wool from liability for a 
deficiency, which automatically releases the Ekins; and fourth, 
that Heller failed to establish what amount, if any, Rock Wool 
owed Heller. The record below contains some competent 
substantial evidence to support each of the findings of fact and 
Heller has not even challenged Finding 8, that it failed to 
pursue the receivables in a commercially reasonable manner, or 
Finding 13, that it failed to prove the amount that Rock Wool 
owed Heller. Hence, the only theoretical possibility that this 
case could be reversed would be if this Court, against the 
unrefuted testimony of Judge Dee and Mr. Tanner, were to somehow 
conclude that they had lied, had in fact engaged in ex parte 
discussions respecting the merits, and that this conduct caused 
the trial to be unfair. There is nothing whatever in the record 
to sustain either misconduct or effect on the outcome. 
On the first issue, impairment of security, this Court 
could, of course, view the Guaranty and the facts surrounding its 
promulgation and execution differently from the Ekins. However, 
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even if this Court should somehow conclude that the Guaranty 
should be interpreted as consenting to impairment, the judgment 
below would nonetheless have to be affirmed on three grounds, 
Heller's breach of contract, Heller's failure to pursue the 
receivables in a commercially reasonable manner, and Heller's 
failure to prove damages. 
On the second issue, breach of contract, there is no 
question of law involved. Heller has not, either below or on 
this appeal, disputed the principle of law that there is an 
implied or statutory covenant of good faith in every contract 
controlled by California law. The only questions raised on this 
point are factual; i.e., did Heller do the things that the 
findings of fact determined? The Ekins have recited chapter and 
verse of abundant evidence sustaining each finding of Heller's 
breach of the covenant of good faith, and the whole structure is 
cemented into place by the testimony of Heller's vice president, 
Hillman, that he did those things "to pressure [the Ekins] into 
making payment." 
But even if this Court were to decide in favor of 
appellant on the first and second points, it still could not 
reverse. There are the unchallenged findings of fact that Heller 
failed to pursue the receivables in a commercially reasonable 
manner and that Heller failed to prove what amount, if any, was 
due from Rock Wool to Heller, thus failing to prove the amount 
that should be recovered of the Ekins if Heller did prevail. 
Absent proof of the amount due, Heller must fail below and on 
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this appeal. In the absence of a finding that it pursued the 
receivables in a commercially reasonable manner Heller must fail 
below and on this appeal. 
It follows that there is no basis for reversing the 
judgment below and it must, therefore, be affirmed; that this 
case should be remanded to the trial court to determine the 
balance of the post-judgment expenses and attorneys fees incurred 
by the Ekins; and that the trial court should be instructed to 
add to the judgment the sum thus determined. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December, 1986. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of December, 1986, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument were 
hand delivered to the following: 
Cary D. Jonesr Esq. 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Sixth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 
/^bt//(-
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ADDENDUM 1 
EARL D. TANNER 
BRAD L ENGLUND 
TANNER, BOWEN & 
1020 Beneficial 
#3187 
#4478 
TANNER 
Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2021 
Attorneys for 
V. Ross Ekins 
and U.S. Rock 
Benefit Trust 
Defendants 
and S. 0. Ekins 
Wool Defined 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN 
INCORPORATED, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
V. ROSS EKINS; S. O. EKINS; 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN 
CORPORATION, a Utah Savings & 
Loan corporation; VALLEY BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking 
corporation; U.S. ROCK WOOL 
COMPANY DEFINED BENEFIT TRUST; 
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK, 
formerly known as WALKER BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-83-2368 
Judge David B. Dee 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
Court on the 25th day of November, 1985, the Honorable David B, 
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Dee presiding. Plaintiff was represented by its attorneys, John 
T. Anderson, Esq, and Cary D. Jones, Esq., of Hansen & Anderson; 
and defendants V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins were represented by 
their attorneys, Earl D. Tanner, Esq. and Brad L Englund, Esq., 
of Tanner, Bowen & Tanner. On December 6, 1983, defendant U.S. 
Rock Wool Company, Inc. (Rock Wool), filed a Petition in 
Bankruptcy which case is still pending in the bankruptcy court. 
Through their attorney of record, Anna S. Drake of Nielsen & 
Senior, Rock Wool and defendant U.S. Rock Wool Defined Benefit 
Trust (the "Trust") advised the Court that they would be bound by 
the determination of such issues as were before this Court, as 
distinguished from the bankruptcy court, without the presence of 
their counsel of record. Defendant American Savings & Loan 
Corporation has been determined to be the first lienholder on the 
premises here involved; First Interstate Bank has been heretofore 
dismissed by stipulation; and defendant Valley Bank & Trust 
Company, a Utah banking corporation (Valley Bank), has stipulated 
with plaintiff that the issues involving Valley Bank remaining 
undetermined after this trial, if any there be, are reserved for 
trial at a later date. The matter was fully presented, argued 
and submitted, and the Court having considered the same and being 
fully advised in the premises and having made and entered its 
Memorandum Decision herein, finds the facts, makes its 
conclusions of law, and directs entry of judgment as follows: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 6, 1983, Rock Wool filed a petition in 
the Bankruptcy Court at Salt Lake City, Utah for a Chapter 11 
reorganization, which was later converted to a Chapter 7 -
proceeding, which is still pending in the Bankruptcy Court and 
which makes Heller's claims for replevin moot so far as this suit 
is concerned. 
2. The agreements involved in this suit specify that 
they shall be governed as to validity, interpretation and effect, 
and in all other respects by the laws and decisions of the state 
of California. 
3. The documents constituting the agreements which are 
the subject of this action consist of Heller's usual printed 
forms which were provided by Heller and had been prepared by 
Heller. They were signed on or about December 27, 1979. One of 
those agreements was a Chattel Mortgage covering, inter alia, 
Rock Wool's motor vehicles. 
4. Heller undertook to perfect its security interest 
in all of the security, but negligently or intentionally failed 
to properly perfect its security interest in the motor vehicles. 
Said failure to perfect impaired that security, was material, and 
was not the result of any act, omission, or statement of either 
of the Skins'. 
5. Heller impaired its remedies and rights against the 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accounts receivable and inventory of Rock Wool, both of which 
were part of the security for the debt referred to in the Ekins' 
Guaranty, by cutting off the cash available to Rock Wool and by 
giving notice to the account debtors at a time and in a fashion 
which it knew would cause the account debtors to stop or slow 
down the payment of their accounts and quit doing business with 
Rock Wool, which eventually destroyed Rock Wool as an operable 
going concern. 
6. The only evidence of the values lost by the 
impairment of the said security was furnished by the Ekins' and 
showed that the security was impaired in the following amounts: 
Motor Vehicles $43,600,00 
Accounts Receivable $41,649,00 
Inventory $25,000.00 
7. The Ekins1 did not consent to Heller impairing its 
rights against Rock Wool or the security for the Rock Wool debt, 
nor did they waive their right to complain of such impairment. 
8. California law provides that when a UCC creditor 
undertakes to collect accounts receivable security, it has the 
burden of proving that it pursued collection in a commercially 
reasonable manner. This Court finds that the only actions taken 
by Heller to effect collection was to send out the February 
notice, which by its own admission it realized would impede 
collection, and to send certain unidentified accounts to an 
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attorney in Tucson, Arizona. There is no evidence as to what, if 
anything, the attorney did to effect collection. This is not 
sufficient to meet Heller's burden and the Court finds that 
Heller did not proceed in a commercially reasonable manner to 
collect the accounts receivable. 
9. The California Civil Code imposes on all parties to 
a contract an obligation of good faith in its performance or 
enforcement. Heller has breached this obligation in its 
eforcement of the contracts on which it claims the Ekins' are 
liable (a) by changing the operating rules on Rock Wool 
unilaterally and creating an insuperable negative balance of 
accounts receivable security; (b) by giving notice to Rock Wool's 
customers which were taken from an obsolete customer list known 
by Heller to contain obsolete balances, and doing so at a time 
when Heller knew it would receive in a day or two the regular 
monthly updated list from Rock Wool containing current 
information; and (c) by attempting to coerce the Ekins' by filing 
suit without notice or demand at a time Heller knew the Ekins1 
were gone from Utah on a multi-year assignment, by claiming an 
unconscionably excessive amount, and by seeking the immediate 
appointment of a receiver to take possession of the Ekins1 home 
and having it sold at a sheriff's sale, all at a time when Heller 
was bound by contract not to take action against the Ekins' home. 
10. Heller made a Subordination Agreement with Valley 
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Bank at the time the Ekins' were refinancing a short-term note 
for $67,000.00 which was ahead of Heller's Trust Deed on the 
Ekins1 home. The Subordination Agreement provided that Heller 
could not demand, receive, accept or otherwise realize on the 
Ekins1 home, or take any direct or indirect action to foreclose 
the Ekins' home or to realize upon its security interest in that 
home until such time as the Valley Bank trust deed had been paid 
in full. There was no provision in the Subordination Agreement 
entitling Heller to acquire or otherwise satisfy the Valley Bank 
loan ahead of its due date and thus accelerate its right to 
proceed against the Ekins' home. 
11. Heller's tender of a Cashier's Check in the sura of 
$55,000.00 was defective and unauthorized, and Valley Bank's 
refusal to accept the tender was not wrongful. 
12. The contracts involved in this case provide for 
payment of attorney's fees to Heller in the event of default* 
Under California law, if a contract so provides, then the 
prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in 
addition to costs of suit. In the instant cause each of the 
Ekins' is, as to Heller, the prevailing party. 
13. Heller has failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence or in any other fashion the correct amount, if 
any, remaining due and unpaid by Rock Wool under its contracts 
with Heller. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The transactions involved in all of the causes 
between Heller on the one side and the Ekins' or Rock Wool on the 
other, except those relating to the Subordination Agreement, are 
governed as to their validity, interpretation and effects, and in 
all other respects, by the laws and decisions of the state of 
California. 
2. The Ekins1 have been exonerated from liability to 
Heller under the Guaranty, and the Guaranty should be declared to 
have been terminated. 
3. The Ekins* are entitled to a decree that the 
obligation secured by the Heller Trust Deed has been terminated 
and is at an end? that the property subject to the Heller Trust 
Deed should be reconveyed to the Ekins1 free and clear of any 
claim or interest of Heller; and the Heller Trust Deed on their 
home be released and terminated. 
4. The Ekins' are entitled to be awarded their 
attorneys1 fees, costs and necessary disbursements which have 
been incurred in this action in an amount to be set by this Court 
upon notice and motion and taxed as costs herein. Said award may 
be supplemented upon notice and motion if post-judgment services 
are required of said defendants1 attorneys. 
5. The Ekins1 have established grounds for liability 
on the part of Heller under their Counterclaim herein, but in 
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light of the determination that they are exonerated and 
released from liability under the Guaranty, have not sustained 
coata and expenaea as a result of Heller's conduct other than 
those attorney's fees, costs, and expenses which are compensated 
elsewhere herein. Accordingly, judgment of no causa of action 
should be entered on the Counterclaim. 
6. Defendant U.S. Rock Wool Defined Benefit Trust is 
entitled to judgment of no cause of action. 
7. As to the defendant U.S. Rock Wool, which had filed 
a Chapter 11 proceedings in bankruptcy on December 6, 1983 and 
waa a debtor-in-poaaeaaion until December 10, 1984, at which time 
the proceedings were converted to a Chapter 7 proceedings and a 
trustee in bankruptcy appointed, aaid defendant and Heller 
treated the matter of the amount, if any, due from Rock Wool to 
Heller, or from Heller to Rock Wool under its Counterclaim as an 
issue which need not be determined herein except to the extent 
necessary to resolve the issue of whether and to what extent the 
Ekins* have been released from their guaranty, leaving said iaaue 
to be determined, as between themselves, in the bankruptcy 
proceedinga. Accordingly, the issues between Rock Wool and 
Heller insofar as they relate to the amounts, if any, which 
should be awarded to one or the other, and title and right to 
posaeaaion of the personal property of Rock Wool, are held to be 
the province of the bankruptcy court, and not precluded by the 
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judgment herein. Subject to the foregoing, each should be 
granted judgment of no cause of action. 
DATED this £9 day of April, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
V/g^ / 2w 
District Judge 
Approved as to form 
this day of April, 1986 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
By 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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EARL D. TANNER #3187 
BRAD L ENGLUND #4478 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2021 
Attorneys for Defendants 
V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Eki 
and U.S. Rock Wool Defined 
Benefit Trust 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN 
INCORPORATED, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
V. ROSS EKINS; S.O. EKINS; 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN 
CORPORATION, a Utah Savings & 
Loan corporation; VALLEY BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking ] 
corporation; U.S. ROCK WOOL 
COMPANY DEFINED BENEFIT TRUST; ) 
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK, ) 
formerly known as WALKER BANK ) 
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking ) 
corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
I JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. C-83-2368 
I Judge David B. Dee 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
Court the 25th day of November, 1985, the Honorable David B* Dee 
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presiding. Plaintiff was represented by its attorneys, John T. 
Anderson, Esq. and Gary D. Jones, Esq., of Hansen & Anderson; and 
defendants V, Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins were represented by 
their attorneys, Earl D. Tanner, Esq. and Brad L Englund, Esq., 
of Tanner, Bowen & Tanner. All other defendants remaining in the 
action were represented or otherwise before the Court by 
stipulation as set forth in the Findings, defendant First 
Interstate Bank having been dismissed. The matter was fully 
presented, argued and submitted, and the Court having considered 
the same and being fully advised in the premises and having made 
and entered its Memorandum Decision herein and its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Laws; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That the Deed of Trust by and between defendants V. 
Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins as trustors, and Walter E. Heller 
Western, Inc. as beneficiary, respecting that certain real 
property in Salt Lake County, Utah, described as "Lot No. 408, 
Mount Olympus Park No. 4," which was recorded at Pages 538, 539, 
and 540 of Book 5020 of the records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder (hereafter "the real property") be, and the same hereby 
is, terminated and released, and the above-described real 
property is hereby reconveyed to V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins 
free and clear of any obligation to, or claim or encumbrance of, 
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plaintiff Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. and its successors or 
assigns* 
2. That defendants V* Ross Ekins, S. 0. Ekinsf and 
Valley Bank & Trust Company have judgment of no cause of action 
on the claims set forth in the Amended Complaint herein. 
3. That plaintiff have judgment of no cause of action 
on the claims set forth in the Counterclaim of defendants V. Ross 
Ekins and S. 0. Ekins herein. 
4. That defendant American Savings & Loan Corporation 
have judgment that its interests in the real property are those 
of a first lienholder, and defendant U.S. Rock Wool Company 
Defined Benefit Trust have judgment that its interests, if any, 
in the real property are superior to the interests of plaintiff 
and are subordinate to the lien of the defendant American Savings 
& Loan Corporation. 
5. That defendants V. Ross Ekins, S. 0. Ekins, and 
Valley Bank & Trust Company have judgment against plaintiff for 
their costs herein, which costs shall, as to defendants V. Ross 
Ekins and S. 0. Ekins, include such attorney's fees, costs, and 
necessary disbursements as shall be determined by this Court upon 
notice and motion. 
6. That defendant U.S. Rock Wool Company, Inc. have 
judgment of no cause of action against plaintiff on the Amended 
Complaint and plaintiff have judgment of no cause of action 
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against said defendant on its Counterclaim? subject, however, to 
the right of each of said parties to take such further action in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, 
Central Division, Bankruptcy No. 83A-03213, as either party may 
deem appropriate to determine the amounts, if any, which either 
of said parties may be entitled to recover from the other, and 
the title and right to possession of the personal property of the 
bankrupt, U.S. Rock Wool Company, Inc. 
Made and entered this ^x day of April, 1986. 
* - . BY THE COURT: 
JOdpc ^ 
U H.JSliApN hu]MQLEY 
^jfii^ 
sy 
Denuty Clerk 
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ADDENDUM 3 
GUARANTY 
To WALTBR B. HBLLBR WBSTBRN, INCORPORATED 
Oaca 
December 27
 19_7_ 
Genclemani 
To induca you co purchase or ocharwita acquire from * L — t L i — R O C k WOO 1 C O . , I T\Q
 t 
(hereinafter callad "Debcor") account* receivable, conditional sale or lease agreemencs, chaccai mortgages, drafts, note*, bills, acceptance*, ci 
receipts, concracct or ochar obligations or choses-tnaction (herein coliecuveiy called "receivables"), or to advance moneys or extend credit to 
Debtor thereon, or co factor the sales or finance the accounts of the Debcor (either according co any present or future existing agreement or 
cording to any changaa in any such agraamanc or on any other cerma and arrangements from time to urne agreed upon with cha Debtor, her 
consenting co and waiving notice of any and all such agreements, cerma and arrange menu mnd changes thereof) or co otherwise directly or 
directly advance money co or give or extend faith and credit to cha Debtor, or otherwise atauc the Debtor in financing IU business or sa 
(wuhout obligacing you co do any of the foregoing) wa, cha undersigned, for value received, do hereby jointly and severally uncondtciom 
guarantee to you mnd your assigns the prompt payment in full ac maturity and all timet thereafter (waiving notice of non-payment) of any * 
all indebtedness, obligations and liabilities of every kind or nature (both principal and interest) now or at any time hereafter owing to you 
cha Debcor, and of any and all receivables herecofore and hereafter acquired by you from said Debtor or in respect of which che Debtor has 
may become in any way liable, and the prompt, full and faithful performance and discharge by the Debtor of each and every one of the ter 
conditions, agreements, representations, warranties, guaranties and provisions on che pare of the Debcor concained in mny such agreement or 
rangement or in any modification or addenda thereto or substitution thereof, or contained in any schedule or other instrument heretofore 
hereafter given by or on behalf of said Debtor in connection with the sale or assignment of any such receivables to you, or contained in any oc 
agreement*; undertakings or obligations of the Debtor with or to you, of any kind or nature, and we also hereby jointly and severally agree 
demand co reimburse you and your assigns for all expenses, collection charges, court costs and attorney's rees incurred in endeavoring to coJ 
or enforce any of the foregoing against the Debtor and/or undersigned or any other parson or concern liable thereon, for all of which, » 
interest ac the highest lawful contract rate after due until paid, we hereby jointly and severally agree to be directly, unconditionally and primai 
liable jointly and severally with the Debcor, and agree chat the same may be recovered m the same or separate actions brought to recover 
principal indebtedness. 
Notice of acceptance of this guaranty, the giving or extension of credit to the Debtor, the purchase or acquisition or receivables, or the 
vancement of money or credit thereon, and presentment, demand, notices of default, non-payment or partial payments And protest, notice 
protest and all other notices or formalities to which the Debtor might otherwise be entitled, prosecution or collection or remedies against the Deb 
or against che makers, endorsers, or other person liable on any such receivables or against any security or collateral thereto appertaining, are he 
by waived. The undersigned also waive notice of any consents to the granting of indulgence or extension of time payment, the taking and releast 
of security in respect of any said receivables, agreements, obligations, indebtedness or liabilities so guaranteed hereunder, or your eccepting pan 
payments thereon or your settling, compromising or compounding eny of the same in such manner and at such times as you may deem advtsab 
without in mny way impairing or affecting our liability for the full amount thereof; and you shall not be required to prosecute collection, •ntoi 
mant or other remedies against the Debcor or againsc any person liable on any said receivables, agreements, obligations, indebtednesa or liabilic 
so guaranteed, or to enforce or resort to mny security, liens, collateral or other rights or remedies thereto appertaining, before calling on us ; 
payment; nor shall our liability in mny way be released or affected by reason of any failure or delay on your part so co do. 
This guaranty is absolute, unconditional and continuing and payment of the sums for which the undersigned become liable shall be made 
you at your oiiicm from time to time on demand m§ the same become or are declared due, notwithstanding that you hold reserves, credits, collate 
or security againsc which you may be entitled Co resort for payment, and one or more and successive or concurrent actions may be brought h« 
on against the undersigned jointly and severally, either in the same action in which the Debtor is sued or in separate actions, as often as deem 
advisable. We expressly waive and bar ourselves from any right to set-off, recoup or counter-claim mny claim or demand against said Debcor, 
againsc any other person or concern liable on said receivables, and, as further security to you, any and all debts or liabilities now or hereaf: 
owing to us by cha Debcor or by such other person or concern are hereby subordinated to your claims and are hereby assigned to you. 
Bach guarantor shall continue liable hereunder until you actually receive written notice from him by registered mail terminating the sat 
at co him; buc cha giving oi such notice shall noc terminate this guaranty as to any other guarantor, nor relieve the one giving such notice frc 
liability as co any debt, undertaking or liability incurred or undertaken prior co such time. The death oi any o( the guarantors shall not car mm* 
this guaranty aa co hit estate or m% co the surviving guarantors, but the same shall continue in full force and effect until notice or termination 
given and received at hereinbefore provided mnd all of said indebtedness, liabilities or obligations created or assumed are fully paid 
In case Bankruptcy or insolvency proceadings, or proceedings for reorganisation, or for the ippunumtnt of a receiver, tru»u« or vustodt-
for the Debtor or over its property or eny substantial portion thereof, be instituted by or against the Debtor, or if the Debtor becomes msolve 
or makes an assignment for the benefit of cradicors, or ectempes to effect a composition with creditors, or encumber or dtspose ol all or a su 
stantial portion of its property, or if the Debtor defaults in the payment or repurchase of any oi such receivables or indebtedness as the ser 
fails due, or fails promptly co make good any defaulc in respect of mny undertaking, than the liability oi the undersigned hereunder shall 
your option mnd without notice become immediacely fixed and be enforceable for che full amount thereof, whether then due or not, the same 
though ail said receivables, debts and liabilities has become past due 
This guaranty shall mure to the benefit of yourself, your successors and assigns. It shall be binding jointly and severally on the unde 
signed, chair hairs, raprasancativat and assigns, regardless of the number oi persons signing as guarantors or the turn or order of their tigmn 
This instrument shall be governed mB to validity, interpretation, effect and in all other respects by the laws and decisions ol the State < 
California. 
4241 Park Terrace Dr. 
S a l t Lake C i t v , Utah 
Residence Address 
c L /r "* ' ~" v /m U \ I. t^ 
V. Rp<ss Skins 
S. 0 , Ek ins 
» iae>« 
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251Q South State -^ • • — — 
Salt lake City, Utah 
In consideration of the financial accomodations given or to be given 
or continued by Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Bank" hereafter) to V. Ross gnd 
Sonoma O. Ekfns ^ ("Borrower" hereafter) the undersigned agrees as 
follows: 
Borrower has the following obligations owing to the undersigned: 
A. Title of obligation or instrument Mortgage 
B. Date of such obligation December 10, 1980 
C. Due date of obligation December 10, 1988 
D. Present balance owing $16,000.00 
E. Security for obligation All of Lot 408, Mount Olympus Park No. 4 
Borrower has or is proposing to obtain a loan from Bank dated 
M q Y 7 19 8 1 , in the amount of $ 67,000 00
 and secure(j by the same 
security or portions thereof as are presently pledged to undersigned and 
described in Paragraph E. 
In consideration of the credit extended to Borrower by the Bank, the 
undersigned hereby subordinates its security interest in the described security 
to the above security interest of the Bank. The Bank may extend, modify or 
renew the so secured obligation without affecting this subordination. The 
undersigned agrees not to demand, receive, accept or otherwise realize on the 
security or the security /interest or to take any direct or indirect action to 
obtain or realize such security until such time as Bank is paid in full. 
The undersigned agrees to pay and/or deliver to Bank immediately upon receipt 
any of the described security or proceeds thereof. 
This Agreement shall inure to and be binding upon the parties and 
their successors, assigns and personal representatives. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Agreement as 
Of this 7th (jdy of Moy , ig£l . 
U.S. Rock Wool Company 
35" ~u ' 2 ; ,T II I Defined Benefit Trust 
z6 ' ^ ° i 
1> 
~\ - m 
V. Ross Ekins, Administrator 
uuninii 
The undersigned Borrower hereby consents to the foregoing Agreement 
and agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions thereof. 
DATED this 7th day of May 
s^b&KU 
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T 
(To be completed i f real estate involved) 
S^Li^i^ p > t ^ ^ ^ J ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Utah 
On the 7th day of _ May 
cn 
_> 19_81
 t personally appeared before ^ 
roe V.Ross & Sonoma O. Ekins, the Borrower, who di^l^acknowledged to me that ^ 
he executed the above and foregoing Acceptance.. ' , f; 
My Commission Expires: H o f ^ ' ftjj&t^'J* j O^  
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A Yes, it was . 
Q And then U.S. Rock Wool would just put that 
figure in Exhibit D-8 and 9 and similar reports? 
A Right. 
Q Now, that figure was determined by the age of 
the accounts on hand plus some other technical factors 
that you had negotiated with U.S. Rock Wool? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Now, directing your attention to Exhibit 8, 
January 21st, 1983, will you tell us how much below the 
line or overdrawn, as the case may be, U.S. Rock Wool was 
12 I on January 21st, 1983? 
13 A Do you want line 10 or line 13? 
14 Q Well, - -
15 A There are two. 
1* Q I want the right one. Maybe we're in error. 
1* A I think you want line 13. 
*• May I explain the difference between the two? 
1* Q Would you please? 
* I A Line 10 indicates the amount of what I call 
over advance or negative availability prior to any borrowing 
22
 I that day. 
23 Q Okay. 
24| A Line 13 is a summation of the entire day's 
activity. So line 13 would give the final over advance or 
21 
25 
>* A/L* 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
negative availability. 
Q So that there were - - there was the ability 
to draw or permission to draw even though they may have 
been overdrawn so long as the overdraft wasn't too big? 
A ,, That's right. 
6
 Q All right. Will you give us both the figure 
7
 on the overdraft as you perceived it and then the overdraft 
8 plus the advances for the day, for January 21st? 
9 A The overdraft prior to the advance was $2,900.82. 
10 After the advance of that day the overdraft went up to 
11 $3,827.84. 
12 Q And at that time how many qualified receivables 
13 did Heller have on this account? 
14 A $120,462.32. 
15 Q Now, directing your attention to Exhibit 9, 
16 first I ask you wasn't Exhibit 9 the first report after 
17 you told U.S. Rock Wool that the amount of unqualified 
18
 receivables was being changed? 
19 A It appears to be, yes. 
20 Q And will you tell us what you showed as the 
21 below the line figure after you had made that change? 
22 A Prior to any advances for that particular day 
23 the negative figure was $51,716.48. 
24 Q Were there any advances made that day? 
26 A Yes, there was. 
A 9 
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1 I Q How much? 
2 I A $480.48. 
3I Q So then below the line how much? 
4
 A Totally $52,196.96. 
5 Q So before the corrected or altered perception 
6
 of the unqualified accounts that took place, as you've 
7 designated heretofore, U.S. Rock Wool would have had to 
8 have collected about $4,000 worth of their outstanding 
9 receivables in order to get back in a positive position 
10 with you; is that correct? 
11 A You mean prior to January 26th? 
12 Q Yeah. 
13 A That is correct, yes. 
14 Q And after you told them of the change that had 
15 been made by you they would have had to come up with some 
16 $52,000 to get back in a positive position? 
17 A That's correct. 
'•' • Q Yeah. You expected that that difference would 
19 be a difference of some significance to you - - to U.S. 
20 Rock Wool when you told them about it, wouldn't it? 
21 A Very definitely. 
22 Q It's a lot higher amount to climb? 
23 A That's correct. 
24 Q Now, there was no alteration made in the 
25 Guaranty form with the Ekins, was there, over your usual form)? 
a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter i^.Heller Western 
INCOHPOMATCO IL± 
L'i^AL NOTJ4 ,: 
(Not ice t o account d e b t o r - pursuant to 
C a l i f o r n i a Commercial c#do s e c t i o n 9318.) 
Date of t h i s N o t i c e : February H, ]')8 3 
To i _^Miai:-Jla4y JLJ^iniL -
-1223. aii^lflO. ..ttiSJt 
Salt, J^luLJCltYi Ptatk, 9410.1 _ . 
The accounts of U.S. Rockwool Company 
have been assigned to Walter C. Heller Western Incorporated 
including your account in the amount of $ L.213 85 
a
* °/ " January Jl, 1983 , as evidenced by the account 
card*copy attached hereto. 
You are requested to make all *hf,*k? on this and any futur 
billiga payable to U.S. Rockwool Company and/or Walter 
E. Heller Western Incorporated, but" mal'l' \\i roctly to: 
Waltci' E. Heller Wester i, incorporated 
333 Market Street, Suit** J10 
San Francisco, Ca. 94 105 
PAYMENT TO ANYONE OTHER THAN IIELMJR WILL RESULT IN DOUBLE 
LIABILITY FOR T!l tS DEBT. 
If any additional information u. rot|uiredf please contact 
us *£ (.415) 777-2540. 
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN INCORPOR-
By <MA 
/ ^CV 
133 u*ry+* o » — * *..,--
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courage to acknowledge that some problems occurred. And I 
would respectfully suggest the Court ought to grant the 
motion to avoid any suggestion later that this matter was 
decided in any way other than on the merits, on the basis 
5 | of the evidence and in the context of regular proceedings. 
6 I On the basis of this record, Your Honor, Heller could 
7 I never be assured it had its fair shot. Myself as an advocate 
8 perhaps I feel otherwise, but Heller doesn't know that, 
9 Your Honor. 
10 Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: Heller is going to have to 
12 take this Court's representation no acts were made with 
13 the Court which in any way influenced the Court's decision 
14 in this matter. And because in a jurisdiction like this 
15 where the County Clerk works to provide clerks to the courts 
16 at his leisure, or at his insistence, and the court 
17 heretofore is run with the County Clerk providing clerks 
18 who came over here, as soon as the judge left the bench, 
19 I the clerks went back to the clerk's office, and the judge 
20 did all the answering in response to the questions. And 
21 as a matter of sheer fact the judges who preceded me in 
22 this function years way before I started practicing, and 
23 for the 35 years that I have been involved in the court 
24 system, Judges Croft and Ellett and others all answered 
26 the telephone because nobody else was here, or their 
~ n>EL 
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reporter did, and that's been the function. We are hampered 
by the fact that thpre hasn't been a statewide overseeing 
of this thing. We're trying to work in that direction. 
The legislature is busy trying to send money to pump the 
Great Salt Lake, so they are not going to take over the 
District Court. This is the only trial court of general 
jurisdiction which isn't a State function. The bailiff 
works for the Sheriff. The clerk for the County Clerk. 
They are both independently elected officials. And as 
the Court, to keep the business of the people of this 
State moving, we have to have someone answer the telephone, 
so the Court does. And I respond to questions about when 
are you going to rule on the motion for summary judgment; 
is this case going to go to trial; are you sure I can summon 
my out-of-state witnesses and be assured we are going to 
be going Monday morning; how do we get the other lawyer to 
withdraw; is there a piece of paper that's there that 
hasn't been signed, I respond to the same sort of questions 
that Mr. Willis does. If from that litigants assume that 
I am going to be talking about the merits of the case, they 
will just have to assume that in error. I can't do anything 
about their thinking. They might even, for reasons of 
their own, think that there's a lot of other things that 
go on here. They weren't present and they couldn't reach 
any reasonable decision about what went on. They are just 
- r±n r) 
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going to have to infer. And I think that's typical of 
losers. When they lose they try to think there must be 
something wrong with having tried the case before a judge 
that didn't have any hair or had blue eyes or something 
else. If that's what they want to do, they will have to 
reach that decision independently. And - - but I will 
7 assure you and your clients, and I respect your judgment 
8 in this matter as a good advocate, and I think you did 
9 an excellent job in this case, that I was in no way 
10 backdoored by Mr. Tanner. He wouldn't, and I wouldn't, 
11 and I think they are just going to have to accept that 
12 representation. Not to say that I didn't have conversations 
13 with him at which you were not present would be untrue. 
14 I did have conversation, and I did with you, as I did 
15 get letters from each of you. And I suppose that's viewed 
16 unilaterally even though the letters were copied to the 
17 adverse party. But as you recall Mr. Ekins at the time 
18 this was started was out of the State, and I kept trying to 
19 put Mr. Tanner's feet in the fire to move it along, as a 
20 matter of fact suggesting that he terminate his client's 
21 assignment out of the State on an LDS mission to get back, 
22 because this is a pretty important case, a pretty harsh 
23 rule for me to take. And I'm sure Mr. Ekins was smarting 
24 under that thinking, that he would have to quit his 
26 religious assignment to come out for this lawsuit. And 
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Mr. Tanner also said I was ruining his summer vacation, 
a lot of things like that, but I did do those things to 
try and move the case along. In all the conversations I 
had as far as I remember had to do with keeping this case 
moving. As you all acknowledge, this case grew like 
6 I Topsy. What initially started out to be a collection 
7 matter, because of the posture of the defendants, that 
8 this was in some way aggregious conduct on the part of 
9 the collector, and because of the California law, it grew 
10 a lot. It grew a lot more than the money involved, but 
11 I can't help that. That's what you wanted to do. And I 
12 was mindful of that, and I was hoping someplace along 
13 the line because of the sum that started out to be collected 
14 that we could resolve the issue. It didn't happen. I made 
15 the decision on the law as I saw it and the facts and I 
16 saw them applied to the law, and I in no way got any 
17 input from Mr. Tanner and his office or Mr. Anderson and 
18 his office that reflected on my determination of law and 
19 fact. 
20 Motion for a new trial is denied. The stay is 
21 denied except as agreed to between counsel without the 
22 posting of the appropriate bond as required by the rules. 
23 Thank you, gentlemen. 
24 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I appreciate 
25 the Court's comments. Just one matter though. 
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il One thing that concerns me is that if the Court 
2 | is convinced that these conversations with Mr. Tanner took 
3I 20 or 30 seconds and was confined totally to scheduling 
4
 matters, I'm at a loss to know how the Court can allow 
5 Mr. Tanner to recover for 12 minutes of time and why the 
6 Court - - "' 
7 THE COURT: I can tell you - -
8] MR. ANDERSON: - - the fact that 20 
9 seconds1 conversation becomes 12 minutes of conversation 
10 on every time sheet that doesn't taint - -
11 THE COURT: That's an easy answer. I 
12 can give you a straight, easy answer. Frequently when 
13 I'm answering the telephone, because there are three lines, 
14 I have to put people on hold, Mr. Tanner says I'm holding, 
15 and that's at my client's expense. And somebody has got 
16 to pay for my time. That's the business I'm in. 
17 I can certainly account for that. If in fact 
18 I said hold the phone while I get the file, which may be in 
19 Mrs. Renshaw!s office, my court reporter, to see what 
20 you're talking about, or hold the phone while I pull out 
21 those documents that may be on my side bar for the 
22 purpose of specifically finding out where they are, I 
23 suppose if Mr. Tanner wants to charge his clients for that 
24 time while he's waiting, he can, but I don't keep time 
26 records. I'm just responding to the question. And this 
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1 I was a complicated case. And I suppose when a piece of 
2 paper might have to do with the question being specifically 
3 asked, it may take me some time to get. 
4
 This may come as a surprise to you. This is 
5 not my only case. 
6 MR. ANDERSON: I appreciate that. 
7 THE COURT: I've other things I'm looking 
8 for, and if I can't find it right away I might put 
9 Mr. Tanner on hold for 15 minutes while I'm looking for 
10 what he wanted me to respond to. Independently I can't 
11 remember the length of that conversation, but I do have 
12 occasions when I do have lawyers on hold for some time 
13 to find out whether the documents they are talking about 
14 have in fact been received in this office or whether they 
15 are across the street in the County Clerk's Office, not 
16 atypical as what I have here today. I've got all your 
17 courtesy copies, and I don't have the file. And the reason 
18 I don't have the file is because one of you has asked 
19 Mrs. Renshaw, the court reporter, to transcribe the record, 
20 and she's got the file. So if you called and asked me 
21 what's in the file, I would have to find out where it is 
22 just today. And that might take me a little while, to 
23 find where Brad or Mrs. Renshaw has got it, and that would 
24 account for a lapse of time. And I can explain that. 
26 Okay. Thank you. 
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EARL D. TANNER #3187 
BRAD L ENGLUND #4478 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2021 
Attorneys for Defendants 
V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Eki 
and U.S. Rock Wool Defined 
Benefit Trust 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN 
INCORPORATED, a California 
corporation, ! 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, ] 
INC., a Utah corporation; ) 
V. ROSS EKINS; S. O. EKINS; ) 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ) 
CORPORATION, a Utah Savings & ) 
Loan corporation; VALLEY BANK 
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking ] 
corporation; U.S. ROCK WOOL ) 
COMPANY DEFINED BENEFIT TRUST; ) 
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK, ) 
formerly known as WALKER BANK ) 
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking ) 
corporation, ] 
Defendants. ) 
) A F F I D A V I T 
Civil No. C-83-2368 
Judge David B. Dee 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
ADDENDUM 8 
FllfO IN C( FRff* OFFICE 
HAr H 10 26 AM '86 
« ii. • s . ., . . . 
. . :. 'v A 
CLERK 
ns 
A * ' V * 
KA. -V* 
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EARL D. TANNER, being duly sworn upon his oathf deposes 
and says: 
1. That he has at all times since the commencement of 
the above action by the plaintiff been the principal attorney for 
V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins, defendants therein, and knows 
whereof he speaks. 
2. That he has not, at any time during the pendency of 
the above-entitled case, discussed the merits of said cause or of 
any of the claims of any of the parties thereto with the 
Honorable David B. Dee outside the presence of the opposing 
counsel. 
3. That it is, and was, his understanding (1) that the 
Rules of Procedure of the Third Judicial District require ex 
parte contact with the Court, either the clerk or, as the case 
may be, the judge, with respect to setting the time when motions 
or other matters can be heard? and (2) that once a trial date has 
been set it cannot be vacated or changed except by the specific 
personal authorization of the judge before whom the trial has 
been set. 
4. That your affiant has searched his files, the 
pleadings and correspondence, and his personal calendar for 
information respecting the reason for and the subject of each ex 
parte communication of which plaintiff complained, and has sought 
to refresh his recollection of the occasion referred to. The 
-2- (rO>* 
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following information respecting each occasion cited by plaintiff 
in its motion is, to the best of the information and recollection 
of your affiant, correct: 
a. June 11, 1984. 
1) The Background. Plaintiff had made a motion 
for partial summary judgment which was heard on May 3, 1984. On 
June 6, 1984 plaintiff's counsel transmitted to the Court and all 
counsel a proposed Order respecting the motion. Exhibit 1 
hereto, a copy of the letter of transmittal, shows that this 
office received it on June 7, 1984. 
2. The Occasion. Four days later, to-wit: on June 
11, 1984, your affiant delivered to the Court a letter of 
transmittal and a courtesy copy of the Ekins Objections to the 
defective proposed Order (Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3 hereto) so that 
the Court would be apprised that there were objections and would 
not sign and enter the proposed Order in the mistaken belief that 
all parties affected by it were in agreement with its terms. The 
pleadings were delivered to Judge Dee by leaving the same with 
his clerk at his courtroom. This was done while affiant was on 
his way to the office of Mr. Veasy, attorney for Valley Bank & 
Trust Company herein, for a pre-arranged conference. So far as 
your affiant is able to determine, no words were exchanged 
between him and Judge Dee on this occasion. 
b. July 5, 1984* 
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1) The Background. On June 27, 1984, Ekins had 
filed a motion for partial summary judgment against plaintiff 
(Exhibit 4), which was noticed for hearing on July 12, 1984 
(Exhibit 5). 
2) The Occasion, On July 5, 1984, your affiant 
received a letter from LaVonne Williams, deputy clerk, indicating 
that her office had been unable to reach him and that the July 12 
setting would have to be rescheduled (Exhibit 6). Upon receiving 
said letter, your affiant tried to contact either Ms • Williams or 
Judge Dee and was unable to reach them. On July 6, affiant was 
able to contact Ms. Williams in Judge Hansen's court and was 
instructed to re-notice the motion for partial summary judgment 
for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on July 27. Affiant's notes respecting 
these contacts and his efforts appear on Exhibit 6. On July 9, 
the re-notice of hearing (Exhibit 7) was served on all parties by 
mailing. 
c. July 26, 1984. 
1) The Background. By order of Judge Dee, over 
the vigorous opposition of the Ekins', the case had been set for 
trial on August 13, 1984. The Ekins' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (Exhibit 4) which was served on all counsel on June 27, 
1984 had been accompanied by a Memorandum. Despite the Court 
extending the time for hearing that motion from July 12 to July 
27, Heller had not responded to the Ekins' Memorandum. However, 
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on July 26, the day before the dispositive motion was to be 
heard, Heller delivered a letter of transmittal (Exhibit 8) and 
its Memorandum to Judge Dee with a copy to your affiant. 
2) The Occasion. After reviewing the Heller 
Memorandum, your affiant contacted Judge Dee by phone to 
determine whether he would permit an oral response to the Heller 
Memorandum inasmuch as the dispositive motion was set for the 
following morning and the case was to be tried some two and 
one-half weeks later. Your affiant told Judge Dee that if he 
would permit the oral response to the late filed memo, Ekins1 
would not move for additional time but would proceed with the 
argument on the following day. Judge Dee said that he would 
permit an oral response. On July 27, the motion was argued and 
taken under advisement. At the end of the hearing Judge Dee 
stated that he would make an early decision on the motion so the 
parties could tell what issues would be litigated and what 
witnesses would be called and could advise their clients, 
d. July 31, 1984. 
1) The Background. By the following Tuesday, July 
31, no decision on the motion for partial summary judgment had 
been received. Less than two weeks remained before trial and the 
motion under consideration would, if granted, relieve the Ekins 
of the necessity of trial. 
2) The Occasion. Affiant called the telephone 
~
5
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number of Judge Dee's court expecting to contact the clerk and 
ask him to remind the judge that time was short and counsel were 
concerned. Apparently the clerk was not in because Judge Dee 
answered the telephone himself. Your affiant said he had called 
because of the press of time and the needs of all of the parties 
to the case, and had expected to talk with the clerk and ask him 
to remind the Court of the need for early ruling. Judge Dee said 
he would look at the matter and to call his clerk that afternoon. 
Affiant did so and was advised that the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment had been denied, 
e. August 1, 1984, 
1) The Background. The Court had denied the 
Ekins • Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the Ekins' had 
decided to seek an interlocutory appeal. 
2) The Occasion. Your affiant contacted the clerk 
of the court to determine whether the trial setting would be 
vacated as a matter of course and was told that no change would 
be made in the trial setting except by Judge Dee himself. 
Thereafter your affiant contacted the other attorneys, Veasy and 
Anderson, and requested that they stipulate to setting over the 
trial date. Mr. Anderson flatly refused. Your affiant advised 
him that he would move to strike the trial setting and try to get 
a hearing as soon as possible, that afternoon if the Court would 
permit. Thereupon your affiant telephoned the clerk of the court 
-6 
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who said this was a matter Judge Dee would have to decide and put 
Judge Dee on the telephone. Your affiant apprised the Judge of 
the Ekins' intent to file an interlocutory appeal, of the failure 
of counsel to agree on vacating the trial setting, and of the 
motion to strike the trial setting which was then in the process 
of being prepared on behalf of the Ekins1. Judge Dee said he 
could hear the matter that afternoon at 3:00, Your affiant 
notified all other counsel of the hearing and caused its motion 
to strike (Exhibit 9) to be served by mail and took copies for 
the Court and all counsel who would be at the hearing that 
afternoon. Heller's counsel was fully aware of everything that 
was being done, since your affiant consulted him with respect to 
each step. He agreed that your affiant would contact Judge Dee 
to get a time for the hearing and would contact all counsel when 
the time was set. At the hearing, Heller1s counsel made no 
objection or complaint. The trial setting was stricken, 
f. December 2, 1985. 
1) The Background. The first two days of trial 
had been held on the two days prior to Thanksgiving, 1985. The 
Court could not continue with this trial because of certain 
criminal matters which had a priority and at the close of the 
second day of trial requested counsel to contact the Court with 
respect to the time when the trial could reconvene. December 2, 
1985 was the first working day after the Thanksgiving vacation. 
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2) The Occasion. Your affiant made two calls to 
the clerk of the Court who stated that he had not been advised by 
Judge Dee what his plans were with respect to scheduling. In 
each instance affiant was requested to call back later and see 
what the status was. On the third call the clerk passed the call 
through to Judge Dee who advised affiant when the trial would 
recommence. Per the Court's instruction and as a matter of 
courtesy affiant called Mr. Anderson and told him the time of 
reconvening. Mr. Anderson*s notes show that he also talked with 
the Judge on this matter. The trial was reconvened on December 
DATED this of May*^E9v6. 
May, 1986, 
D. TANNER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
v 
M±t <' m I xf ,rk . Vy. M # X ^ 
Notary/Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
State of Utah /My Commission Expires: 
-8-
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Hansen Jones Maycock & Lets 
I Cordon H«rtt«ft ' . SaK iaa« G<y. o<a* ttftoi rt4«phorw 
C i f y O Jor«t Wiw 
John • Maycoclt 
David C Lola 
ftooori C Mafcunty 
Stuart A PraxJmaft 
John T Andtrtoft 
Una f Harrison 
Mlchaal N. Imary 
June 6. 1984 
RECUt 
JUN 7 
The Honorable David B. Dee 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Walter W. Heller Western Incorporated v. U. S. Rock 
Wool Company. Inc.. «t al. 
—Civil No7g-8J-UM 
Dear Judge Deet 
Enclosed for your examination and signature, please find a proposed Order 
Respecting Partial Summary Judgment in the above case. The proposed Order has 
been drafted in conformity with a hearing held before you on May 3, 1994. Copies 
of the proposed Order have been provided to all counsel of record. 
Thank you vary muoh for your attention to this matter. 
truly""youra, 
John T. Anderson 
JTAiclm 
Enclosure 
oc Anna W. Drake, Esq. 
Earl D. Tanner, Jr., Esq. 
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq. 
Ted Boyer, Esq. 
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It ALT U K I CITY, UTAH t»-4lll U.M.A. 
Juna 11, 1984 
Clark of District Court 
P.O. Box 1860 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Rat Hallar vs. U. S. Rock Wool Company, at al 
Dear Clarkt 
Enclosed plaaaa find *n Objection to Propoaed Ordar f 
Partial Summary Judgment and Ordar Respecting Partial Summary 
Judgment, In tha above-captloned matter, for filing with tha 
Court. 
Thank you for your asaiatance. 
Very truly yours. 
Z+s S%—i $ks 
Carl D. Tanner, J r . 
EDTJRiwt 
Enclosures 
cct John T. Anderson, Esq. 
Theodora Boyer, Esq. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq. 
W. Jeffrey Plllmore, Esq. 
Anna Drake, Eaq. 
c &&*-
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At tn* , for Defendants 
V. Rosa Ekina and S. 0. Ekins 
IN THB THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATB OP UTAH 
WALTER £. HELLER WESTERN 
INCORPORATED, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 'r-" 
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation; V. ROSS 
EKINS; S.O. EKINS; AMERICAN 
SAVINGS & LOAN CORPORATION, 
A Utah Savings * Loan corpora-
tion; VALLEY BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah banking corpor-
ation; U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY 
OEPINEO BENEFIT TRUST; and 
PIRST INTERSTATE BANK, former-
ly known as WALKER BANK k TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah banking corpor-
ation, 
Defendants. 
) 
) ' 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
ORDER FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C No. C83-2368 
Judge David B. Lee 
Defendants v. Ross Ekins and s. O. Ekins by and through 
their counsel, object to entry of the order respecting partial 
summary judgment proposed Walter F. HalUr Western y^^ .'i.''-*'* 
V 
PS-
aiu defendants object to the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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proposed Order upon the grounds that it does not accurately 
reflect the stipulation presented to the Court. 
Attached hereto aa Exhibit "A" is an Order which store 
accurately reflects the aforesaid stipulation. 
i/ 
DATED this jl day of June, 1984,. 
Earl D. Tanner 
Earl D. Tanner, Jr. 
TANNER, 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17! 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
imnmm 
ifssnciAfc 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the //***day of June, 1984, I sailed 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to Proposed 
Order for Partial Summary Judgment, postage prepaid, to the 
following! 
Anna Drake, Esq. 
NEILSEN 4 SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq. 
59 W. Broadway 
4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq. 
175 S. Main 
• 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
PVV*-*" 
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N*CA 
N«*tc»AA» 
r*f« trtii 
•f CiYV. 
Theodore Boyer, Esq. 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS 6 CAHOON 
77 W. 2nd £« 
• 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
John T. Anderson# Esq. 
SO W. Broadway 
• 1200 
Salt LakM f i t y , UT 84101 
^^^Lx / ^ /fmAV. 
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EARL D. TANNER #3187 
EARL 0. TANNER, JR. #3188 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 • 
Telephonei (801) 583-2021 
Attorneys for Defendants 
V. Ross Ekins and S. O. Ekins 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN 
INCORPORATED, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation; V. ROSS 
EKINS; S.O. BKINS) AMERICAN 
SAVINGS & LOAN CORPORATION, 
a Utah Savings fc Loan corpora-
tion; VALLEY BANK fc TRUST ) 
COMPANY, a Utah banking eorpor- ) 
at Ion; U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY ) 
DEFINED BENEFIT TRUST; CARY ) 
O. JONES, successor trustee; ) 
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK, ) 
fomerly known %m WALKER BANK ) 
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking ) 
corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) AGAINST PLAINTIFF 
Civil No. C83-2368 
Judge David Dee 
Defendants V. Ross Bkins and S. 0. Ekins <"Ekins"), 
through their counsel, hereby move the court pursuant to Rule 56 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r 
^_• 
..Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for the entry of partial nummary 
judgment that the Trust Deed attached as Exhibit A* to the 
Amended Complaint is votd *rtrt nneril nr ceable and that plaintiff i 
not entitled to attorney's fees incur red in, connection, with i's 
attempted foreclosure. 
This motion is based upon t h* »yb |e*,* t Ti nat De ed, i he 
accompanying Certificate of the Inaurance Department of the Stat 
ot Utah; the accompanying i 'er t, 11 i .„ lit <\ of the Executive 
Department, Office of Lieutenant Governor, State of til ah the 
accompany (riKj Memorandum of Points and Authorities; and the file 
herein. 
Dated this QM day r June, 1984, 
EARL D. TANNER 
EARL D, TANNER, JR. 
TANNER, BOWEN k TANNER 
for Defendants 
ins and S 0. Skins 
2-
,T.iVtV 
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CERTIFICATE OK SERVICE 
I certify that on the £2^*day of June, 1984, I serve* 
the foregoing MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF by mailing a true and correct copy thereof, poatage 
prepaid, to the following} 
Cary 0. Jonea, Esq. and 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
HANSEN, JONES MAYCOCK 4 LETA 
Suite 1200, Valley Tower 
SO West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Anna W. Drake, Esq. 
NIELSEN 6 SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq. 
BIELE, HASLAM fc HATCH 
400 Valley Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq. 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ted Boyer, Esq. 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS fc CAHOON 
200 American Savings Plasa 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-3-
Mytf** 
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EARL D. TANNER 
EARL D. TANNER, 
TANNER, BOWEN fc 
1020 Beneficial 
#3187 
JR. #3188 
TANNER 
Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone! (801) 583-2021 
Attorney for Defendants 
V. Rosa Ekins and s. O. Ekins 
IN THE THIRD JUDIICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AMI) KOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN 
INCORPORATED, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
INC. , U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY,  
a Utah corporation) v. ROSS 
EKINS; S.O. EKINS) AMERICAN 
SAVINGS fc LOAN CORPORATION, 
A Utah Savings k Loan corpora-
tion; VALLEY BANK 6 TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah banking corpor-
ation) U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY 
DEPINED BENEPIT TRUST) and 
PIRST INTERSTATE BANK, former-
ly known as WALKER BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah banking corpor-
ation, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NOTICE OP HEARING 
Civil No. C83-2368 
Judge David Dee 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TOl THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OP RECORD HBRIINt 
c 
<;0 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Motion For Partial Suaunar 
Judgment Against Plaintiff of defendants V. Ross Ekins and S. ' 
Ekins will be heard before the Honorable David Dee on the 12th 
day of July, 1984, at 8:45 o'clock a.m. or as soon thereafter i 
counsel may be heard at the Salt Lake County Courthouse, 240 EJ 
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
DATED this 3 ^ day of June, 1984. 
TANNER, J^OWEN k TANNER 
BY :^  ___ _ , 
for v. Rosa Ek ins 
and ST O. Ek ins 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone! (801) 538-2021 
c ^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
J i,;€!'llf|" that on the ^ ? day of June, 1984
 t mmi 
a tn ie and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing, 
poatage prepaid, to t h«e following t 
Cary D. Jones, Esq* and 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
HANSEN, JONES, KAYCOCK k LETA 
Suite 1200, Valley Tower 
SO West Broadway 
- Salt Lake City, UT 84101 " 
Anna W. Drake, Esq. 
NIELSEN £ SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq. 
BIBLE, HASLAM fc HATCH 
400 Valley Tower 
Salt Lake City, utan tjHiOl 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq. 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ted Boyer, Esq. 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS 4 CAHOON 
200 American Savings Plata 
77 Meat 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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EARL D. TANNER 
1020 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER 
36 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
RECfcl^ O 
JUL b HEC'U 
TANNER ,* TANNER 
HU.Y I, 1»)8 
DEAR MR. TANNER, 
OUR OFFICE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO REACH YOU KECAURDINC CASK 
NUMBER C83-2368, WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN INCORPORATED. VS. 
U.S. ROCK WOOL ET. AL., THE ABOVE NAMED CASE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN 
SCHEDULED BY YOUR OFFICE FOR MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON'JULY 12,1984 AT 8:45 A.M. BEFORE JII DCK DAVID B. DEE. BECAUSE 
OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE ON JULY 12, AND 13, WE NEED TO 
RESHCEDULE YOUR MOTION. WE APPOLOC T;'. E FOR THE CONTINUANCE. WOULD 
YOU PLEASE CONTACT ME AT YOUR CONVENIENCE TO CET A NEW DATE FOR 
HEARING? 
S INCEREI .Y ) 
-x ( V ^ I - O V \ X X > L A ^ ^ ' V - J 
LAVONNK W I L L I A M S 
DKPUTY COURT Cl.KRK 
S i S - y S O d OK V I *> 5 1 1 1 
. _ . > < • < • 
c 
- ; • - ( . < • 
-Y,' •' >€ (S*"*^ 
J/^^J. (LuJ-
*~3>f- 1677 
Cl-Y ^
1 : Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JULY 3 , 1 9 8 4 
C H 1-1M<> 3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CKRTIFY THAT I MAll.Kl) A TKUK COPY OK 
LETTER POSTAGE PRE PAID TO FOLLOWING COUNCKL: 
EARL D TANNER 
1020 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER 
36 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH H4111 
GARY D. JONES, ESQ. AND 
JOHN T. ANDERSON, ESQ. 
SUITE 1200,.VALLEY TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH H4101 
Till: KORKCOJ NC 
ANNA W. DRAKE, ESQ. 
1100 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER 
36 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH H41U 
W. JEFFREY FILLMORE, ESQ. 
PAUL VEASY 
400 VALLEY TOWER 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH H/. 1 n 1 
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD 
175 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TED BOYER, ESQ. 
200 AMERICAN SAVINGS PLA/.A 
77 WEST 200 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
OOAAAAL 
DATED W H S 3rd DAY OF JULY 1984 
C iy*S> 
1>* 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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EARL O. TANNER #3187 
EARL O. TANNER, JR. #3188 
TAMMBR, BOWEN * TANNER 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephonei (801) 583-2021 
Attorneya for Oefendanta 
V. Roaa Bklne and S. O. Bklne 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AMD POR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN 
INCORPORATED, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
va. 
U.8. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation} V. ROSS 
EKIMBf S.O. EKINSf AMERICAN 
SAVINGS k LOAM CORPORATION, 
a Utah SavInge t Loan corpora-
tion! VALLEY BANK k TRUST ) 
COMPANY, a Utah banking corpor- ) 
Ation; U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY ) 
DSPIMBD BSMEPIT TRUST| CARY ) 
0. JOME8, eucceeaor truetee$ ) 
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK, ) 
formerly known aa WALKER BANK ) 
lb TRUST COMPANY, a Utah banking ) 
corporation, ) 
Dafandanta. ) 
•" " 11 
> RE-NOTICE OP HEARING 
Civil MO. C83-2348 
Judge David Dae 
TOi THE ABOVB-MAMBD PLAIMTIPP AMD ITS COUNSEL OP RECORD HEREIN; 
PLEASB TAKE NOTICB that tha Notion for Partial Suamar* 
Judgment Against Plaintiff of defendanta V. Roaa Bklna aad S. O. 
rOV"' Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
o 
Eklna achadulad for haarlng bafora th« Honorabla David Daa on t 
12th day of July, 1984, at 8t45 o'clock a.*., h*» baan aat ovar 
at th* Inatruction of »U* Cuuii to th« 27th day of July, 1984, * 
IOIOO a.a. or aa aoon tharaaftar aa counaal atay t»* iiaard. »i tn. 
Salt t*ka County Courthouaa, 240 Eaat 400 South, Salt Laka City. 
Utah 14X11. 
OATBD thla 9th day of July, 1984. 
EARL ». TANNER 
EARL D. TANNER, JR. 
TANNER, BOWEN ^ TANNER 
J?A 
D*K+ndant* 
-S» »H1». f* «• °- «*tM 
r O V ^ 
•1»1^ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I certify that on the 9th day of July, 1984, I served 
the foregoing RE-NOTICE OP HEARING by mailing a true and correct 
copy thereof, postage prepaid, to the followingi 
Cary D. Jones, Esq. and 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
HANSEN, JONES HAYCOCK 4 LETA 
Suite 1200, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Anna w. Drake, Esq. 
NIELSEN * SENIOR 
\ 1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
W. Jeffrey Plllaore, Bag. 
BIBLE, HASLAH 4 HATCH 
400 Valley Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Panela T. Greenwood, Esq. 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ted Boyer, Esq. 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS 4 CAJIOON 
200 American Savings Plass 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
.«<rfi 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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J Gordon Manaan 
Gary 0 Jonaa 
Junn 8 MayCOCfc 
Oavid g Lata 
Rooart C Oalanunty 
Stuart A Ff&rwn 
John r Andaraon 
j ana f Harriaon 
Mtohaat N £mary 
Mtonaat? jonaa 
Hansen Jones Maycock & Lata 
Sixth Floor. Vfcttoy Towar Butfding 
60 W*a* Broadway 
Salt Laft* City. Utah 64101 Tatapnona 
Ainu m i 
5327520 
July 26, 1984 
HAND-DELIVERED 
The Honorable David B. Dee 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated v. U. S. Rock Wool Company, Inc., et al. 
- — — — Cflvil No. C-83-2368 
Dear Judge Deex 
Enclosed for your consideration please find Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant E kins' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Hearing on 
that motion is presently set for Friday, July 27, at 10:00 a.m. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
V J^fery tadtysyours, 
John T. Anderson 
JTAsclm 
Enclosure 
cc Anna W. Drake, Esq. 
Earl D. Tanner, Sr.f Esq. 
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq. 
Ted Boyer, Esq. 
rOl>' 
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Attonmrm tor Defendants 
V. Ross Ekins and S. O. Ekins 
IN THB THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN 
INCORPORATED, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
17 
10 
19 
P.O 
21 
no 
23 
24 
\b 
6 
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation; V. ROSS 
EKINS; S.O. EKINS; AMERICAN 
SAVINGS 6 LOAN CORPORATION, 
A Utah Savings 6 Loan corpora-
tion; VALLEY BANK 4 TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah banking corpor- ) 
at ion; U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY ) 
DEFINED BENEFIT TRUST; and ) 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK, former- ) 
\y known as WALKER BANK 4 TRUST ) 
COMPANY, a Utah banking corpor- ) 
ation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
MOTION TO STRIKE TRIAL 
SETTING 
Civil No. C83-2368 
Judge David B. Dee 
Defendants V. Ross Ekins and S.O. Ekins, by and through 
their attorneys, move the Court to strike the setting of the 
above-entitled action for trial on August 13, 1984 pursuant to 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4.3(a) 
if ( '•ev2*> 
*TJ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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19 
20 
>f the Roies of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit 
u.- h# tate ot Utah. 
Good cause tor striking sani •• iti Main exisia in that 
these defendants propose to petItion the Supreme Court to grant 
an interlocutory appeal M o m I lm fourt's denial of their Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. Minute -"i-™
 n waa 
imiAiiM HI IHJ 1 y \\, l^oi ouc «.••« formal order lias not. yet been 
entered. Such A petition for JIUHI iinuiiiry ap|.i«rtl is proper ata 
demonstrated the case -jt Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d. 435, 
Grounds an appeal before final judgment umin in 
t isolution ut «...„ question ot trie authority of «he 
successors ••«"» *« unou« «<< m i ' lal < • ustee to foreclose a tru: 
deed is fundamental tubstantial portion of this litigation 
I defendants' position that such a trust 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
. aowun 
M M M 
•MPtclAk 
rewuM 
deed is void ab initio or that such a ti ISUJH I A- ha power to 
foreclose; Valley Bank k Trust , American savings and Loan, U.S. 
Hock Wool Company iwfin<a<1 h«n«)fit Trust, and First Interstate 
Bank will not be necessary parties to this action; the effect of 
t / Bank subordination agreement upon Heller's ability tc 
foreclose will not be an issue nor will associated problems of 
the single action rule; Heller's contested "tender- to Valley 
Bank will be moot; whether the trustee (Cary D. Jones, Esq.) • 
necessary party will be moot; anc the propriety of Harmon, Tones 
-K & Leta'a judicial foreclosure *,t A trust deed whose 
trustee is a member of their firm will lie imi the validity 
-2- CW& Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1 
of the proposed foreclosure and sale of the Ekins* home will be 
determined in advance of judgment. 
Equally important, the issue presented for appeal is on 
of general concern to the community. As the attached excerpt 
from Utah Land Title Association's ULTA Newsletter (April, 1983) 
shows, there is presently no authoritative answer to this coamon 
title problem. Resolution of this matter may remove uncertainty 
in many transactions by providing a needed title standard. 
i>r 
Dated this* _/ day of August, 1984. 
TANNER, BOWE.N 4 TANNER 
-3-
O'A 
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CERTIFICATE Ok MAILING 
I car* i|y »M.M on ( h<t /^jf". ijd^ o t August, 1984, I mull 
a true and correct copy of «: h* foregoing Motion to Postpone 
Trial, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Carey D. Jones, Esq. 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
HANSEN, JONES, MAYCOCK & LETA 
Suite 1200, 50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Anna w. Drake, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Benefical Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 
W. Jeffrey Fillmore, Esq. 
BIBLE, HASLAM k HATCH 
Suite 400, Valley Tower 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Esq. 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 11) 
Ted Boyer, Esq. 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS fc CAHOON 
200 American Savings Plaza 
7 West Second South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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THE COMMISSIONER'S CORNER 
i now bacoma battar acquainted 
I varioua punitiva orders avail-
>m this office end used where 
lata after administrative proce-
solving a licanaaa. In sequence 
ily they includa: 
official letter of raprimand in-
to carry soma cumulative effect 
ipacl to later complaint* but 
mora severe panalty la not cur* 
arrantad. 
ordar imposing a fine, which it 
ks tha imposition of a fina in 
mattara. Such an ordar will 
ilao require llcanaa auapanaion 
ation if unpaid aftar $ specified 
order auspanding a licenea for 
fiad term 
)rder of licanaa revocation, 
alactad to add an additional 
tha Commissioner's repertoire 
of available caaa closing documents. 
Tha additional form is intended aa tha 
counterpart of the letter of reprimand 
and will be uaad as a letter of apprecia-
tion or compliment in thoae frequent 
caaes where the complaint is inspired 
by misunderstanding, or sometimes 
even a vengeful desire to 'stick the tine 
company" I am very well aware of the 
prediction of ineureds and others to 
blame closing officers or agents gener-
ally tor problems which reeh^ result 
from their own poor judgment. While I 
do not minimize our fiduciary or profes-
sional responsibility to buyers, sellers, 
lenders and borrowers generally. I also 
recognize their desire to consider us aa 
effectual guarantors of the eternal hap-
piness of each and every party to each 
and every transaction, however, laced 
with potential diaaatar for causes be-
yond the scope or control of the li-
censed agenta. 
I em delighted at my opportumllee to 
make a more frequent uae of tha thank 
you" type closing document than the 
four enumerated above. Stay out of 
"flaky ' transactiona If the deal do#sn t 
make sense to you it probably won't to 
the parties involved either. They will 
always aasume you not only understand 
the details but also Know a will be dis-
charged without any complication. Tha 
careful escrow officer will uae his "aiath 
sense" to detect in advance and avoid 
the inchoate law suit just looking for a 
place to light and the questionable doe-
ing which may wail end up bearing tha 
next insurance Department file numtm. 
Lewt* $ LwnQiloa 
Title Market Conduct Enemmet 
(Reminder; Agents are to file financial 
statements by April 3a 1tt3. pursuant 
to section 31-26-26 (2) J 
liflMftL 
VIBM! 
jf ua nave been faced with the 
i where we encounter a re-
Deed of Trust that names, aa 
a peraon or entity that la not 
to act as *uch under the terms 
§ 67-1-21(1). It haa been my 
ind practice that by subatitut-
quailfied Trustee, you could 
ceed to have the Substitute 
econvey tfie Deed of Trust or 
[he power of sale given to qual-
ities by UC.A §67-1-23. 
•r, a recent decision out of tha 
net Court in and for BOM Elder 
eld that the Substitute Trustee 
situation cannot exercise tha 
sale and that the Deed of Trust 
foreclosed aa a Mortgage. 
B IOWA I. et at va. W BLAINE 
H, #t. al. Civil Number 17472 
Ct.. Ut March 4, 1003). The 
not disturb the priority of tha 
eed of Truet in reaching ita 
lion that the Deed of Truet 
foreclosed Judicially aa a 
jrt relied on tha language of 
S7-1-22(1) which providae In 
he time the Substitution la 
record, the new Truatee shall 
i to all the power, duties, 
y end title of tha Trustee 
i the Deed of Trust and ot any 
or Trustee." 
i original Truatee waa unquah 
under Utah Law. tha auccee-
a acquires no power, dutiea 
ty from the ongmel Truatee 
-n».*» **t*r\g\f\i nmjrmmgi l / \ A V A T * 
e opinion 
of one State District Court Judge and 
does not carry the weight or finality of a 
Utah Supreme Court Decision How-
ever, the Court's reasoning is not faulty 
even if it does ignore the practical con-
sequences, and we must develop 
appropriate policies to guide our busi-
nesses in dealing with this new issue 
Sincerely, 
Rodney M Pipella 
Counsel. Security Title Co/ 
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